Verified results, with the evidence attached.

#E[2](𝔽̄_p) = 4` and `E[2] ≅ (ℤ/2)²` — N13 at `n = 2`, completing the small-prime subfamily `n ∈ {2,3,5,7}` (`secp256k1Bar_two_torsion_structure` + the closure characterization `secp256k1Bar_two_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: `2•P = O ⟺ y = 0`. Structurally the `n = 2` N13 instance — no multiplication formula: `2•P = O ⟺ P = −P ⟺ y = negY = −y ⟺ y = 0` (`char ≠ 2`), and `y = 0` on the curve forces `x³+7 = 0`. So `E[2] = {O} ∪ {(x,0) : X³+7-root}`, an explicit 4-element finset (no `±y` split — `y = 0` is forced), `1 + 3 = 4 = 2²`; N10(iii) at prime 2 classifies. The even companion of the odd family)

#E[3](𝔽̄_p) = 9` and `E[3] ≅ (ℤ/3)²` — node N13 at `n = 3` (`secp256k1Bar_three_torsion_structure`: the 3-torsion subgroup of secp256k1 over the algebraic closure is additively `ZMod 3 × ZMod 3` — the full 2-dimensional `𝔽₃`-plane. Route: the torsion set is proved EQUAL to the explicit 9-element finset `{O} ∪ {(x, ±y) : Ψ₃(x) = 0}` — membership by the closure bridge, `y ≠ 0` at every `Ψ₃`-root by `Ψ₂Sq ⊥ Ψ₃`, the two `y`-values distinct since `char ≠ 2`, exactly `4` distinct roots by the separability certificates; count `1 + 4·2 = 9` by finset card algebra (`secp256k1Bar_three_torsion_ncard`/`_card`/`secp256k1Bar_torsionBy_three_card`); then the kernel-structure lemma N10(iii) classifies. Composes six previously landed rungs (closure bridge, exact root counts, coprimality certificate, `±y`-pairing, N10(iii), torsionBy vocabulary) — the endpoint `N13@3` of the `ψₙ↔E[n]` critical path at `n = 3`)

#E[4](𝔽̄_p) = 16` and `E[4] ≅ (ℤ/4)²` — N13 at `n = 4`, the first composite torsion-structure case (`secp256k1Bar_four_torsion_structure`: the closure doubling formula supplies `secp256k1Bar_two_nsmul_coords`; the closure bridge gives `4•P=0 ⟺ ψ₄(P)=0`; the explicit split `E[4]=E[2] ⊔ P₄` counts `4 + 6·2 = 16`; the internal two-torsion is identified with ambient `E[2]`, hence has card 4; and `nonempty_addEquiv_zmod_four_prod_of_card_and_two_torsion` classifies the resulting finite abelian group. The result is existence of an additive equivalence, not a canonical basis. Honest scope: concrete `n=4` only; the uniform composite-`n` theorem remains open)

#E[5](𝔽̄_p) = 25` and `E[5] ≅ (ℤ/5)²` — N13 at `n = 5` (`secp256k1Bar_five_torsion_structure` + the closure bridge `secp256k1Bar_five_nsmul_eq_zero_iff` (`FiveTorsionBridgeBar.lean`, token-identical port of the `𝔽_p` five-bridge incl. `five_core`): the 5-torsion set equals `{O} ∪ {(x, ±y) : preΨ₅(x) = 0}` — 12 distinct roots (separability certificates) × 2 + O = 25 = 5²; `y ≠ 0` via `Ψ₂Sq ⊥ preΨ₅`; N10(iii) classifies. Replication of the E[3] pattern)

#E[7](𝔽̄_p) = 49` and `E[7] ≅ (ℤ/7)²` — N13 at `n = 7` (`secp256k1Bar_seven_torsion_structure` + the closure bridge `secp256k1Bar_seven_nsmul_eq_zero_iff` (`SevenTorsionBridgeBar.lean`, token-identical port of `seven_master`/`seven_core`): 24 distinct `preΨ₇` roots × 2 + O = 49 = 7²; `y ≠ 0` via the new `Ψ₂Sq ⊥ preΨ₇` certificate; N10(iii) classifies. The N13 instance family is now `n ∈ {3, 5, 7}` — every odd prime with a landed torsion bridge; the general-`n` theorem remains the open program (separability/N10 general core))

#E[n] ≤ n²` point-cardinality bound for secp256k1 (`secp256k1_{three,five,seven}_torsion_card_le`: `Nat.card {P // n•P = 0} ≤ n²` for n = 3,5,7 — i.e. ≤ 9 / 25 / 49 torsion points; upgrades the earlier x-*coordinate* count to a genuine point count, converting an asserted-but-unproven docstring claim into a kernel-checked theorem via a ≤2-to-1 fiber argument + the division-polynomial degree bounds. Dodges the point-counting barrier: an upper bound needs no exact `#E(𝔽ₚ)` computation)

*(alternate/supporting)* Semaev `S₃` full symmetry — `S₃_symm₁₂` (swap `x₁,x₂`) and `S₃_symm₂₃` (swap `x₂,x₃`), so `S₃` is symmetric in all three `x`-arguments, as a summation polynomial must be

*(alternate/supporting)* `S₄` infrastructure — the `S₃`-as-polynomial bridge `S₃poly_eval` (`(S₃poly …).eval x₃ = S₃ …`) and `S₄`'s full symmetry: block swap `S₄_block_swap` `(x₁,x₂)↔(x₃,x₄)` (from `resultant_comm`) and within-pair `S₄_symm₁₂`, `S₄_symm₃₄` — so `S₄` is symmetric on all of `{x₁,x₂,x₃,x₄}`, the symmetry a summation polynomial must have

*(alternate/supporting, n=3 bridge)* concrete iff `3•P=0 ⟺ 3x⁴+84x=0` (`secp256k1_three_nsmul_eq_zero_iff_poly`), root-form iff (`secp256k1_three_nsmul_eq_zero_iff_eval`), `Ψ₃`/torsion-poly eval lemmas (`secp256k1_Ψ₃_eval`, `secp256k1_eval_threeTorsionPoly`), point↦root map (`secp256k1_three_torsion_x_mem_Ψ₃_roots`), its set form (`secp256k1_threeTorsionX_subset_Ψ₃_roots`), and the dedup card bound (`secp256k1_Ψ₃_roots_toFinset_card_le`)

*(alternate/supporting, n=5 bridge)* the core `x(2P)=x(3P) ⟺ ψ₅=0` field-algebra identity (`five_core`) and the concrete eval lemmas `secp256k1_preΨ₄_eval` (`= 2x⁶+280x³−784`), `secp256k1_psi2_evalEval` (`= 2y`)

*(alternate/supporting, n=7 bridge)* the core slope-algebra certificate `seven_master` (`G·(ℓ₂²−3x)⁶·(2y)¹² = −4(x³+7)·ψ₇`) and the `x(3P)=x(4P) ⟺ ψ₇=0` step `seven_core

*(alternate/supporting, order classification)* the reusable order-upgrade lemma `addOrderOf_eq_of_prime_nsmul` (prime `ℓ`: `addOrderOf P = ℓ ⟺ ℓ•P=0` for nonzero `P`) and concrete-poly corollaries `secp256k1_addOrderOf_three_iff_poly` (`= 3 ⟺ 3x⁴+84x=0`), `secp256k1_addOrderOf_five_iff_poly` (`= 5 ⟺ 5x¹²+…=0`)

*(alternate/supporting, point count)* `Set.ncard` carrier forms `secp256k1_{three,five,seven}_torsion_ncard_le`; the fiber/curve machinery `px`/`py`/`secp256k1_curve_of_nonsingular`; concrete degree-12/24 polynomials `Q5`/`Q7` with `_eval`/`_natDegree_le`/`_ne_zero`; and x-root-membership `secp256k1_{five,seven}_torsion_x_mem

*(alternate/supporting, this batch)* Shamir polynomial-identity form `shamir_reconstruct_poly`; the GLV `E[n]`-self-map `secp256k1_glvPoint_mapsTo_torsion`; and the simple-group packaging `secp256k1_scalar_isSimpleAddGroup

*(instantiation, multiparty protocols)* the same concrete-`⟨G⟩` realization for the multi-signer / threshold protocols — aggregate Schnorr / Taproot multisig `secp256k1_threshold_schnorr_aggregate` (MuSig/FROST), MuSig2 key aggregation `secp256k1_musig_key_aggregate`, Feldman VSS share verification `secp256k1_feldman_vss_verify` (DKG), threshold ElGamal partial-decryption combination `secp256k1_threshold_elgamal_combine`, batch Schnorr verification `secp256k1_schnorr_batch_verify

*(secp256k1 instantiation)* the same global descent over `𝔽̄_p` for secp256k1 (`secp256k1Bar := secp256k1.map (algebraMap _ _)`): a non-coprimality of `Φ n`/`ΨSq n` over `𝔽_p` produces consecutive `normEDS` zeros over `𝔽̄_p` — the N5 obligation for secp256k1 reduced to the scalar sequence

*(supporting, conditional all-index frontier)* Integral division-resultant transport and the exact missing geometric bridge (`secp256k1_resultant_eq_intCast` proves that every fixed-size integral resultant commutes with reduction; universal bad-prime support implies `IsCoprime` for every pair of distinct odd primes; independently, the exact algebraic-closure root-to-torsion proposition implies the same theorem. Both universal premises remain explicit `def : Prop` inputs, not global assumptions; unconditional all-index support remains open)

11-division polynomial is nonzero (deg 60 ⇒ `preΨ' 11 ≠ 0`; its root multiset in `𝔽_p` is well-defined and finite)

13-division polynomial is nonzero (deg 84 ⇒ `preΨ' 13 ≠ 0`; its root multiset in `𝔽_p` is well-defined and finite)

2-torsion `x`-coordinate ⇒ root of `Ψ₂Sq` (division-polynomial↔torsion, rung 4 forward)

3-torsion `x`-coordinate set is finite (`secp256k1_threeTorsionX_finite`: the set `threeTorsionX = {x | ∃ y h, 3•(x,y)=0}` of `x`-coordinates of nonzero 3-torsion points is finite — via the bridge it embeds into the roots of `Ψ₃`)

3-torsion bridge over `𝔽̄_p`: `3•P=0 ⟺ ψ₃(P)=0` (`secp256k1Bar_three_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: for a nonsingular affine `P` on `secp256k1Bar` over `K=AlgebraicClosure (ZMod p)`, `3•P=0 ↔ (ψ 3).evalEval P = 0 ↔ 3x⁴+84x=0` — the per-point `n=3` division-poly↔torsion equivalence over the closure (node N11@3), the `𝔽̄_p` port of `ThreeTorsionBridge.lean`. Per-point iff only; the surjectivity-onto-roots, `#E[3]=9` count, and group structure are downstream, not here. No `native_decide`)

5-division polynomial is nonzero (deg 12 ⇒ `ψ₅≠0`; 5-torsion `x`-coords are a proper finite set)

5-torsion bridge over `𝔽̄_p`: `5•P=0 ⟺ ψ₅(P)=0` (`secp256k1Bar_five_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: for a nonsingular affine `P` on `secp256k1Bar`, `5•P=0 ↔ (ψ 5).evalEval P = 0` — per-point `n=5` bridge over the closure (N11@5), `𝔽̄_p` port of `FiveTorsionBridge.lean`; the module also proves the `2•P=0 ⟺ y=0` half. Per-point iff only; `#E[5]=25`/group downstream. No `native_decide`)

7-division polynomial is nonzero (deg 24 ⇒ `ψ₇≠0`; 7-torsion `x`-coords are a proper finite set)

7-torsion bridge over `𝔽̄_p`: `7•P=0 ⟺ ψ₇(P)=0` (`secp256k1Bar_seven_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: for a nonsingular affine `P` on `secp256k1Bar`, `7•P=0 ↔ (ψ 7).evalEval P = 0` — per-point `n=7` bridge over the closure (N11@7), `𝔽̄_p` port of `SevenTorsionBridge.lean`. Per-point iff only; `#E[7]=49`/group downstream. No `native_decide`)

7` is a quadratic non-residue modulo `p`; no affine secp256k1 point over `𝔽_p` has `x=0` (`secp256k1_seven_not_isSquare`: Euler's criterion contradicts the closed witness `7^(p/2) ≠ 1`; `secp256k1_x_ne_zero`: substituting `x=0` into `y²=x³+7` would exhibit `7` as a square)

A rational point is a closed point (maximal ideal) (`xyIdeal_isMaximal`: for `(x,y)` on any Weierstrass curve over a field, the ideal `⟨X−x, Y−y⟩` of `F[E]` is maximal — since the quotient `F[E]/⟨X−x,Y−y⟩ ≃ F` is a field. Establishes each `F`-rational point as a closed point of the affine curve; the prerequisite for localizing at `P` (the local ring `F[E]_P`) to evaluate rational functions regular at `P` — the next infrastructure rung toward the Weil pairing's `f_P(D_Q)`)

Affine Weierstrass points are finite over any finite ring — general lemma (Mathlib-gap upstream candidate) (`instFinitePoint`: `Finite W.Point` for every `W : WeierstrassCurve.Affine R` with `[CommRing R] [Finite R]`, via `Point ↪ Option (R × R)`. Weakest hypotheses — no `Field`/`Nontrivial`. Mathlib v4.31.0 has no `Finite`/`Fintype` instance on any `Point` variant (gap confirmed against pinned source); natural upstream home `Mathlib/AlgebraicGeometry/EllipticCurve/Affine/Point.lean`. Subsumes the two per-curve instances below, now one-line `inferInstance` corollaries. Pure-kernel)

Bounded decomposition fan-out (index-calculus cost ingredient) (`secp256k1_decomposition_completions_le_two`: fixing a base coordinate `x₁` and the target `x_R` with `x₁ ≠ x_R`, at most 2 field elements `x₂` complete a 2-decomposition `S₃(x₁,x₂,x_R)=0` — any finite set of completions has card `≤ 2`. A degree-2 polynomial over a field has `≤ 2` roots, so the index-calculus relation graph has bounded fan-out at each factor-base point. The one exact, kernel-checked quantitative fact under the prime-field cost analysis — *not* the hardness claim itself, which stays an open conjecture; see `BARRIERS.md`)

Common root ⇒ consecutive `normEDS` zeros (local descent) (over an integral domain, if `ΨSq n` and `Φ n` both vanish at `x₀` then `w n = 0` and `w(n−1) = 0 ∨ w(n+1) = 0`: `ΨSq = w²` kills `w n`, then `Φ = x·w² − w₊w₋` collapses and a domain has no zero divisors; node N5 local step)

Compressed division polynomials — cube-covariance structural core + `m∈{3,5,7}` forms (`cube_covariant_support`/`exists_comp_X_pow_of_invariant`/`exists_X_mul_comp_of_covariant`: over any field with a primitive cube root `β`, `p(βX)=c·p(X)` forces every support exponent `k` to satisfy `β^k=c`, hence `c=1 ⇒ p∈F[X³]` and `c=β ⇒ p∈X·F[X³]` with the matching `deg` drop — the foundation-free structural heart. Applied unconditionally to secp256k1's concrete forms: `Ψ₃=X·R₃(X³)` (`deg R₃=1`), `preΨ₅=R₅(X³)` (`deg R₅=4`), `preΨ₇=R₇(X³)` (`deg R₇=8`), plus the new bare degree `deg preΨ₉=40`. For `m∈{9,11,13}` the compressed form is stated conditional on the polynomial-level `β`-covariance of `ψ_m` (`preΨ'_compressed_of_{invariant,covariant}`) — the isolated missing lemma (repo has only the `eval`-level covariance, `m∈{3,5,7}`). Concrete forms inherit `Lean.ofReduceBool` from `native_decide` degree facts; the structural core does not. Drafted with the Kimi K3 proof-drafter, kernel-verified in CI)

Conditional propagation of isolated infinity slots and exact balanced single-affine-chart reduction (under affine external inputs and nonzero endpoint determinants, distance-two infinity pairs force explicit consecutive-input projective determinants and reduce the 377 interior separated masks to 129 under the named uniform determinant guards. Distance-three pairs force literal three-input `HValue` equations, giving 69 masks; adding the two boundary-near `HValue` guards gives 36. The independent boundary-only branch gives 60 from 129 and is not a distance-three result. Every internal infinity slot also forces an explicit lower-stage frozen prefix or suffix specialization to vanish. Six prefix and six suffix obstructions cover slots 1 through 12 with maximum frozen stage five. A projective frozen chain implies the corresponding frozen specialization over any field, so affine inputs, nonzero endpoints, and pointwise nonzero balanced obstructions force the infinity mask to be empty and make both the full chart cover and literal chart-polynomial cover exactly the single affine chart. After the existing injective algebraically closed base change, the source frozen stage-14 equation has the same conditional single-chart equivalence; target witnesses are not asserted to descend. Honest scope: the uniform local guards include endpoint-redundant cases and define a slightly smaller locus than the maximal one. Symbolic nonzeroness, nonemptiness, density, probability, and genericity of the balanced regular locus are not proved. One chart does not mean one witness, one relation, independent relations, solver readiness, improved yield or rank, lower solving degree, reduced memory/runtime/total cost, exact-target computation, reduced ECDLP complexity, or an ECDLP attack. The four mask cardinalities `129/69/60/36` are compiler-trusted through `native_decide`; the propagation, one-way resultant, mask-empty, cover-equivalence, and source-bridge theorems use the standard Lean/Mathlib trust base)

Coordinate-ring translation `φₙ·ΨSqₙ = Φₙ·ψₙ²` (N7-uniform S1 brick, curve-generic) (`mk_ψ_sq`: `mk W (ψ n)² = mk W (C (ΨSq n))`, and `mk_φ_mul_ΨSq`: `mk W (φ n)·mk W (C (ΨSq n)) = mk W (C (Φ n))·mk W (ψ n)²` in the affine coordinate ring `W.CoordinateRing` of an arbitrary Weierstrass curve `W` over any `CommRing R`, all `n : ℤ` — the algebraic link between the *bivariate* division polynomials `φₙ/ψₙ²` that compute `x([n]•P)` on points and the *univariate* `Φₙ/ΨSqₙ` whose degrees Mathlib supplies. Two-step rewrites over Mathlib's own congruences `mk_ψ`/`mk_Ψ_sq`/`mk_φ`. Honest scope: coordinate-ring identity only — the Point-level statement `x([n]•P)=φₙ(P)/ψₙ(P)²` on `E(k)` needs the multiplication-by-`n` coordinate map (absent from Mathlib) and is not claimed here; this is the substrate that step consumes, first brick of the N7-uniform build (`BARRIERS.md §B3`). No `native_decide`, no new axioms)

Curve25519 base point on curve; constants validated (`Curve25519_generator_equation`: the RFC 7748 base point `u=9` satisfies the Montgomery equation in `𝔽_p` — one `native_decide` validating `p`, `A`, `Gu`, `Gv` together; a rational point of the Mathlib curve)

Curve25519 is Montgomery, not short Weierstrass (`Curve25519_a₂_ne_zero`: `a₂=486662≠0`, the `u²` coefficient — a structural contrast with secp256k1/P-256 (`a₂=0`); with cofactor 8 (vs. prime order), shows the formalization is tied to neither curve *shape* nor prime order)

Curve25519 is a genuine elliptic curve (Montgomery model) (`Curve25519_Δ_ne_zero` + `IsElliptic`: `v²=u³+486662u²+u` over `𝔽_p`, `p=2²⁵⁵−19`, discriminant a unit — a third curve, and a *different model*: the same Mathlib EC group law now covers a Montgomery-form, non-short-Weierstrass curve, under `[Fact p.Prime]`)

Dependence relation recovers the discrete log (`jacobson_xedni_dependence_recovers_log`: for `Q = x•P` in any `AddCommGroup`, a nontrivial integer relation `a•P + b•Q = 0` with `b` a unit mod `n = addOrderOf P` pins the discrete log `x ≡ -a·b⁻¹ (mod n)` — the neutral algebraic core of the Jacobson–Xedni point-dependence idea; Layer-3 generated from corpus claim `jacobson-xedni-dependence-recovers-log-003`, closed via `addOrderOf_dvd_iff_zsmul_eq_zero` + `ZMod` arithmetic)

Deployed signature/agreement protocols are correct on the concrete secp256k1 group (the abstract `Ecdlp.Schnorr` correctness theorems instantiated at the concrete carrier `↥⟨G⟩` with base point `secp256k1Gₙ`, about genuine curve points: Diffie–Hellman agreement `secp256k1_dh_agree`, Schnorr/EdDSA verification `secp256k1_schnorr_verify`, Bitcoin Taproot key-tweak `secp256k1_taproot_tweak_verify` (BIP-341), adaptor-signature completeness `secp256k1_adaptor_complete` (atomic swaps / Lightning PTLCs). Contingent only on `ord(G) = n` + the abstract algebra — the honest content: the real secp256k1 protocols verify on the actual curve subgroup, not only an abstract module)

Distinct points ⇒ distinct closed points (full separation) (`xyIdeal_ne_of_ne`: for rational points `(x₁,y₁) ≠ (x₂,y₂)` on a Weierstrass curve the maximal ideals `⟨X−x, Y−y⟩` differ — combining the x-coordinate case with the `YClass` companion `xyIdeal_ne_of_y_ne` (`y₁ ≠ y₂ ⇒` distinct ideals, same unit-in-a-maximal-ideal argument on `Y − ·`). The complete divisor-support-separation lemma for the Weil pairing: any two distinct rational points are distinct closed points of `F[E]`)

Distinct x-coordinates ⇒ distinct closed points (`xyIdeal_ne_of_x_ne`: rational points on a Weierstrass curve with `x₁ ≠ x₂` give different maximal ideals `⟨X−x, Y−y⟩` of `F[E]`. Proof: `XClass x₁ − XClass x₂ = algebraMap F F[E] (x₂−x₁)` is a unit when `x₁ ≠ x₂`; equal ideals would force that unit into a maximal (proper) ideal — contradiction. The divisor-support separation the Weil pairing needs — the points of `D_Q` chosen to compute `f_P(D_Q)` must avoid `P`, `O`, which requires distinct points to be genuinely distinct closed points; scouted + proved on the warm-server loop)

Division-polynomial doubling `ψₙ ∣ ψ₂ₙ` (N7-uniform S2 brick — the ω prerequisite, curve-generic) (`ψ_two_mul`: `ψ₂ₖ = ψₖ · complEDS₂ ψ₂ (C Ψ₃) (C preΨ₄) k`, and `ψ_dvd_ψ_two_mul`: `ψₖ ∣ ψ₂ₖ` in `R[X][Y]` for an arbitrary Weierstrass curve `W` over any `CommRing R`, all `k : ℤ` — the explicit factorisation making `ψ₂ₖ/ψₖ` a genuine polynomial. This is exactly the "as a start … `ψₙ` always divides `ψ₂ₙ`" step that Mathlib's own module docstring names as the first prerequisite for the (still-`TODO`) bivariate `y`-coordinate division polynomials `ωₙ := (ψ₂ₙ/ψₙ − ψₙ·(a₁φₙ + a₃ψₙ²))/2`. Because `W.ψ` is definitionally `normEDS ψ₂ (C Ψ₃) (C preΨ₄)` and Mathlib now carries the scalar 2-complement `complEDS₂`, the anticipated induction is a direct specialization. Honest scope: the `ψₙ∣ψ₂ₙ` divisibility only — `ωₙ` is not defined (needs the further `÷2` well-definedness, Mathlib's open `TODO`), and no `Point`-level `[n]`-arithmetic is claimed; S2 substrate the `ω`/`[n]`-map steps consume. No `native_decide`, no new axioms)

Division-polynomial evaluation bridge — `ΨSq`/`Φ` at a point ↔ scalar `normEDS` (curve-generic, all `n : ℤ`: with `β² = Ψ₂Sq(x₀)` and `w k := normEDS β (Ψ₃ x₀) (preΨ₄ x₀) k`, `(preΨ n).eval x₀ = preNormEDS(β⁴)(Ψ₃ x₀)(preΨ₄ x₀) n`, `(ΨSq n).eval x₀ = w n²`, and `(Φ n).eval x₀ = x₀·w n² − w(n+1)·w(n−1)` — pure consequences of Mathlib's `preΨ`/`ΨSq`/`Φ` and `normEDS` twist conventions; nodes L2/L3 toward N10(i). Certificate `scripts/certs/eval_bridge_check.py` prints `CERT_OK`; no `native_decide`, no new axioms; curve-agnostic/upstreamable)

ECDSA known/leaked-nonce private-key recovery (`ecdsa_known_nonce_recovers_key`: `s·k=z+r·x` with known `k`, `r≠0` ⇒ `x=(sk−z)/r` — the biased/leaked-nonce (HNP) scenario, distinct from nonce-reuse)

ECDSA nonce-reuse private-key recovery (`ecdsa_nonce_reuse_recovers`: two signatures `sᵢ·k = zᵢ + r·x` sharing nonce `k`, `s₁≠s₂`, `r≠0` ⇒ `k=(z₁−z₂)/(s₁−s₂) ∧ x=(s₁k−z₁)/r` — the exact algebra behind the Sony PS3 / Android-Bitcoin key thefts; stated over any field, no adversary/probability model)

ECDSA signature malleability — the algebraic core of BIP-62 rule 5 / BIP-146 low-`s`; noninjectivity of the secp256k1 `x`-projection (every signature `(r,s)` has a sibling `(r,−s)` verifying the same message/key: `ecdsa_sibling_signing_equation` — the signing identity holds for `(−s,−k)`; `ecdsa_sibling_scalars` — `u/(−s) = −(u/s)` negates both verifier scalars; `secp256k1_pointX_neg` — point negation fixes the `x`-coordinate (`−(x,y)=(x,−y)`, `a₁=a₃=0`); `secp256k1_pointX_not_injective` — the concrete witnesses `G` and `−G` have equal `pointX` but are distinct because `G` is nonzero and secp256k1 has no nonzero two-torsion; `secp256k1_pointX_neg_zsmul_add` — the negated verification point has the same `pointX`. Honest scope: identity-level algebra and one representation boundary, no `Verify` predicate, no hash/DER level, no `ZMod p → ZMod n` reduction of `x`, no SGGM lower-bound instantiation, and no ECDLP speedup. Field lemmas pure-kernel; closed repository instantiations of the parameterized coordinate lemmas inherit compiler-trusted primality facts, while `secp256k1_pointX_not_injective` directly inherits `Lean.ofReduceBool` from the no-two-torsion computational certificate in `CurveCardinalityExact.lean`)

E[n] = ker[n]` (torsion = kernel of the multiplication-by-`n` endomorphism)

E[n]` = points of order dividing `n` (`P∈E[n] ⟺ ord P ∣ n`)

Exact affine/infinity chart-polynomial cover of the frozen stage-14 `C16` predicate (an infinity mask `I : Finset (Fin 14)` represents every selected slot by `[1:0]` and every remaining slot by one affine scalar `[X_i:1]`. For each fixed mask, `ChartVar I` has exactly `14 - I.card` variables and `ChartEquation` has exactly fifteen literal `H` equations: one base equation of total degree at most two, thirteen internal equations of degree at most four, and one final equation of degree at most two. The existential finite chart cover is exactly equivalent to `FrozenProjectiveChain`, the TASK-022 guarded system, and, after the existing injective base change into an algebraically closed target field, the source frozen stage-14 predicate. Honest scope: `[1:0]` is retained and `[0:0]` is never introduced; the `2^14` logical masks are not enumerated or materialized. Counts are representation inventory, not independent dimensions or relations, and all degree statements are upper bounds. This theorem-only result claims no base-field descent, solver run or solver-readiness result, relation yield, rank, recovery, cost advantage, exact-target computation, or ECDLP attack. `card_chartEquation` is compiler-trusted through `native_decide`; `card_chartVar`, the equivalences, and the degree bounds use the standard Lean/Mathlib trust base)

Exact distinct-root counts of `ψₙ` over `𝔽̄_p`: `4/6/12/24` for `n=3/4/5/7` (`secp256k1_Ψ₃_roots_card_bar` + `preΨ₄`/`preΨ₅`/`preΨ₇` (=`6`/`12`/`24`), with `…_roots_nodup_bar` (`.Nodup`) and `…_separable` (`Separable ψₙ`): `((ψₙ).map φ).roots.card` over `𝔽̄_p`, `φ:𝔽_p→𝔽̄_p` the base change — the separability/root-count layer, from squarefreeness + `IsAlgClosed.splits` + `splits_iff_card_roots`. For odd `n` the count is `(n²−1)/2`; the even `n=4` gives `6` = the primitive-4-torsion `x`-coordinates (`(#E[4]−#E[2])/2`). A statement purely about `ψₙ` and its roots in `𝔽̄_p`; the `#E[n]` consequence is deferred to the structure assembly)

Exact guarded scalar representation of the frozen stage-14 `C16` predicate (over a source field `k`, an injective coefficient map into an algebraically closed field `K` carries `specialize q y (frozenC k 14) = 0` iff the literal finite polynomial family `∃ assignment : GuardVar → K, ∀ e : GuardedEquation, MvPolynomial.eval assignment (guardedEquation q y e) = 0` holds. Four raw scalar coordinates `(U,V,A,B)` for each of fourteen intermediate projective slots give 56 variables; fifteen literal `H` equations plus fourteen guards `AU+BV−1=0` give 29 equation-family members. Every equation has total degree at most four. The guards exclude `[0:0]` and retain `[1:0]`. Honest scope: target witnesses need not descend to `k`; 56 variables and 29 equations are raw counts, not independent dimensions or relations. This is one literal finite `MvPolynomial` family equivalent to the recursive chain, not a parallel recursive syntax, expanded direct `S17`, solver input, rank/yield result, solving-cost claim, or ECDLP attack. The two finite-cardinality facts are compiler-trusted through `native_decide`; the equivalence and degree-bound theorems use the standard Lean/Mathlib trust base)

Exact-order small-prime torsion classification (`secp256k1_smallprime_addOrderOf`: for a nonzero affine `P=(x,y)` and each prime `ℓ ∈ {2,3,5,7}`, `addOrderOf P = ℓ ⟺ (ψ ℓ).evalEval x y = 0` — the capstone tying the full per-`n` bridge ladder to *exact point order*; upgrades each `ℓ•P=0` bridge to an order statement since a `Point.some` is automatically nonzero and `ℓ` prime)

Fixed-formal-degree projective resultant and literal TASK-018 Sylvester convention (for positive declared degrees over an algebraically closed field, under explicit actual-degree bounds, `Res(f,g;m,n)=0` iff the fixed-degree homogenizations share a non-irrelevant projective root. Zero forms and degree drops are included: affine roots use `[x:1]`, while simultaneous degree drop is witnessed by `[1:0]`; `[0:0]` is excluded. The mapped and injective-base-change forms retain the formal degrees. The literal TASK-018 matrix — first `n` shifted descending rows of `f`, then `m` of `g`, with descending columns — is exactly a simultaneous row/column reversal of Mathlib's transposed Sylvester matrix, so its determinant equals the fixed resultant with coefficient unit exactly `1`, without primitive/content normalization. Honest scope: the general coefficient-map theorem is not the specialization theorem for the frozen recursive `C_r`; neither that specialization nor the universal reverse `C16 → C2` implication is proved here)

Frozen recursive projective `C_r` specialization, uniform output degree, and one-step reverse interface (`frozenC R s = C_(s+2)` is the literal TASK-018 left-fold recursion. After every coefficient map and valid projective leaf specialization, each successor equals the exact literal Sylvester determinant at fixed formal degrees `(2^(s+1),2)` with coefficient unit `1`; separate corollaries cover affine output `[y:1]` and infinity `[1:0]`. The predecessor output degree is uniformly at most `2^(s+1)`: the determinant has two rows constant in the new output and `2^(s+1)` rows of degree at most two. Hence, over an algebraically closed field, every frozen successor vanishes iff its predecessor and local `H` slice share a non-irrelevant projective root, without a residual degree hypothesis. Honest scope: this is a one-step witness interface, not yet the recursive witness-chain induction `C16 → C2`, a direct-S17 equivalence, or a solving-cost claim)

Function-field `a/b` extraction — every rational function is a quotient of regular functions (`functionField_exists_num_den`: every `f` in the curve's function field (`FractionRing F[E]`, definitionally) equals `algebraMap a / algebraMap b` with `b ≠ 0` — via `IsLocalization.surj` on the nonZeroDivisors localization; with the division-free form (`functionField_exists_mul_num_den`), cross-multiplication faithfulness of two presentations (`functionField_num_den_cross`), nonzero-numerator (`functionField_num_ne_zero`), the weld to `evalFracAt` (`evalFracAt_num_den_well_defined`: presentations regular at `P` evaluate equally), and the Miller instantiation `secp256k1_miller_function_num_den` (the W2 generator `f_P` = an explicit quotient `↑a/↑b`, and the fractional ideal is generated by that quotient). Honest scope: the extraction controls `b ≠ 0` but not *where* `b` vanishes — choosing a presentation with `b(P) ≠ 0` for `f` regular at `P` is the documented next rung, then `f_P(D_Q)` and W4)

GLV automorphism orbit structure (orbits of `glvPoint` have size ≤ 3; away from the `x=0` fixed locus exactly 3: `secp256k1_glvPoint_orbit_closed` — `{P, φP, φ²P}` is `φ`-closed (cycling via the existing `glvPoint_cube_eq_id`, `φ³=id`); `secp256k1_glvPoint_orbit_three_distinct` — the three are pairwise distinct for `x≠0`. The group root of the measured `~3×` GLV factor-base constant (P0–P4): orbit size ≤3 ⇒ at most a 3× compression, a constant, never an exponent change — not an ECDLP advantage. Compiler-trusted: the orbit facts lift `Secp256k1.beta_field_eigenvalue` (`native_decide`), so they inherit `Lean.ofReduceBool`)

GLV covariance law of the division polynomials (`ψ_m(βx) = β^((m²−1)/2)·ψ_m(x)`: for `j=0` each `ψ_m` sits on one exponent-residue mod 3, so `β` acts by a scalar — `Ψ₃(βx)=β·Ψ₃(x)` (`secp256k1_Ψ₃_eval_glv`), and `preΨ' 5`, `preΨ' 7`, `Ψ₂Sq` are `β`-invariant (`secp256k1_{preΨ₅,preΨ₇,Ψ₂Sq}_eval_glv_invariant`), from the explicit forms + `β³=1`. Explains the failed experiment #100: `Res(preΨ' 5(X), preΨ' 5(βX)) = Res(preΨ' 5, preΨ' 5) = 0` identically because `preΨ' 5` is `β`-invariant — the split/inert resultant test was ill-posed, not a signal. The residual is closed by a kernel-only `linear_combination`, but the underlying cube fact `β³=1` lifts `Secp256k1.beta_field_eigenvalue` (`native_decide`), so these results inherit `Lean.ofReduceBool` — compiler-trusted, not kernel-only)

GLV covariance of Semaev `S₃`/`S₄` and exact relation-set transport (`S₃_diagonal_cube_covariance` and `S₃_diagonal_cube_zero_iff` prove simultaneous polynomial covariance and preservation of the `S₃=0` condition; `S₄_diagonal_cube_invariant` proves exact diagonal invariance of the resultant-defined `S₄`. The secp256k1 specializations instantiate these identities at the GLV cube root. `secp256k1_glv_list_sum_eq_iff` and its three-point form prove `ΣPᵢ=R ⟺ Σφ(Pᵢ)=φ(R)`. The fixed-target theorem layer is S₄ only: `S₄_glv_target_transport` and `S₄_glv_fibre_transport` distinguish the polynomial target exponent from the fibre direction. `secp256k1_glv_affine_target_moves` combines `secp256k1_x_ne_zero` with `secp256k1_glv_fixed_target_moves`, proving that every `𝔽_p`-rational affine target is moved by nonidentity diagonal GLV scaling. The exhaustive fixed-target `S₄` coordinate-scaling classification is deliberately NOT claimed in Lean and remains independently replayed certificate evidence. Scope excludes the point at infinity, extension-field targets, and non-scalar or birational automorphisms; no asymptotic or ECDLP consequence is claimed)

GLV eigenvalue property `φ=[k]`, conditional on cyclicity (if `E(𝔽_p)` is cyclic then `glvHom` is multiplication by a fixed `k:ℤ` with `(k²+k+1)•P=0` for all `P` — the geometric `β`-action *is* scalar `[λ]`; a genuine reduction isolating the one deep missing input, point-counting `#E=n`, as the explicit `[IsAddCyclic]` hypothesis)

GLV eigenvalue ⇒ scalar action (an endomorphism `φ` fixing a cyclic group's generator as a `λ`-eigenvector acts as `[λ]` on the whole subgroup: `φ x = λ•x`; the algebraic core of the GLV speed-up used on secp256k1, promoted from stem `glv_root_mod_n_condition_008`)

GLV endomorphism bundled as `AddMonoidHom` (`glvHom : Point →+ Point`; *supporting* — repackages `glvPoint_add`, no new content)

GLV endomorphism has order dividing 3 (`glvPoint³=id`: iterating `(x,y)↦(βx,y)` scales `x` by `β³=1`; the CM automorphism is order-3)

GLV endomorphism is *not* the identity (`glvHom ≠ id`, witnessed by `β·Gx ≠ Gx` on the base point — rules out the degenerate case, so with `glvHom³=id` and `φ²+φ+1=0` the order in `Aut(E)` is *exactly* 3: `glvHom` is a primitive cube root of unity ⇒ `ℤ[ω]↪End(E)`, genuine CM)

GLV endomorphism is a primitive cube root of unity (`φ²+φ+1=0`: `glvPoint²(P)+glvPoint(P)+P=0` for all `P`; the CM / `End(E)` structure behind GLV — reached with no `λ`, no point-counting)

GLV endomorphism is an automorphism (`glvPoint` is bijective — `glvPoint²` is its two-sided inverse, from `glvPoint³=id`)

GLV endomorphism preserves `n`-torsion (`glvPoint` maps `E[n]→E[n]`; restricts to an endomorphism of the torsion, still `φ²+φ+1=0` there — the scene where `[λ]` lives)

GLV endomorphism preserves nonsingularity (smooth `(x,y)` ↦ smooth `(βx,y)`; `β` a unit)

GLV endomorphism preserves the curve (`(x,y)↦(βx,y)` keeps `Y²=X³+7`, via `β³=1`)

GLV endomorphism satisfies its minimal polynomial in `End(E)` (operator form: `glvHom∘glvHom+glvHom+id=0` as `AddMonoidHom`s — `φ²+φ+1=0` in the endomorphism ring, composable with Mathlib's hom API; *alternate/operator form* of `secp256k1_glv_cube_relation`)

GLV fixed locus meets `E[n]` trivially when `gcd(n,3)=1` (`secp256k1_glvPoint_fixed_coprime_three`: `Coprime n 3 → n•P=0 → glvPoint P = P → P = 0` — the coprime-3 fixed-point-freeness of the CM automorphism, the group-law shadow of `ker(φ−1) ⊆ E[3]`)

GLV map is an additive endomorphism (`glvPoint(P+Q)=glvPoint P+glvPoint Q`, all branches; homomorphism half only — the `glvPoint=[λ]` eigenvalue property is not proved)

GLV slope scaling, all branches (unconditional: GLV scales the addition slope by exactly `β²`)

GLV slope scaling, secant branch (`x₁≠x₂`: `slope(βx₁,βx₂)=β²·slope`, via `β⁻¹=β²`)

GLV slope scaling, tangent branch (doubling `x₁=x₂`: `3(βx)²/(2y)=β²·slope`)

GLV structure is one scalar on base and target (no-go, cond. cyclicity) (`secp256k1_glv_single_scalar`: under cyclicity, on a DLP instance `Q = m•P` the endomorphism satisfies `glvHom P = k•P` and `glvHom Q = k•Q` for the one eigenvalue `k` with `k²+k+1≡0` — it multiplies base and target by the *same* `k`, leaving `m` invariant. The entire CM "extra structure" is this single known relation; no new unknown, no new equation on `m`)

GLV β-equivariance of `addX` (`addX(βx₁,βx₂,β²ℓ)=β·addX`; new `X`-coord scales by `β`)

GLV β-equivariance of `addY` (`addY(βx₁,βx₂,y₁,β²ℓ)=addY`; `Y`-coord unchanged)

GLV/CM automorphism permutes the `n`-torsion (`secp256k1_glvPoint_bijOn_torsion`: the order-3 GLV endomorphism `glvPoint` restricts to a `Set.BijOn` of `E[n] = {P \| n•P=0}` onto itself — additivity sends `E[n]` into itself, `glvPoint³ = id` gives surjectivity; a new endomorphism↔torsion interaction, no point-counting/Weil needed)

GLV/CM endomorphism preserves the discrete log (no-go) (`secp256k1_glv_preserves_dlog`: for every scalar `m:ℤ` and points with `Q = m•P`, `glvHom Q = m•glvHom P` — mapping a DLP instance `(P,Q)` through the GLV endomorphism gives another instance with the same secret `m`. The endomorphism is a DLP self-reduction that is the identity on the exponent, so *this reduction* cannot shrink it: the formal core of the believed "CM-by-`ℤ[ζ₃]` gives no asymptotic advantage against ECDLP" — a scoped, not universal, no-go (it does not rule out some unknown faster algorithm using `ℤ[ζ₃]`; it proves *this* map is exponent-preserving). The order-3 automorphism buys only a constant factor (~√3 rho, ~2× scalar-mult). Unconditional as an identity on the exponent)

IsCoprime` ↔ no common root (over a field `k`, non-coprime `f,g ∈ k[X]` ⇒ a genuine common root in any algebraically-closed extension, + easy converse — the field↔`k̄` bridge B1 consumes, independent of the open L4 TODO; node L1 of B1, general/upstreamable)

Kernel-structure lemma — order `n²` killed by prime `n` ⇒ `(ℤ/n)²` (a finite abelian group `A` with `∀ a, n • a = 0` and `Nat.card A = n²`, `n` prime, is additively `ZMod n × ZMod n`: killed-by-`n` gives the `𝔽_n`-vector-space structure via `AddCommGroup.zmodModule`, `n² = n^dim` pins `dim = 2`, dimension classifies. Input (iii) of node N10 of the `ψₙ↔E[n]` bridge — the group-theoretic half of `E[n] ≅ (ℤ/n)²`, stated curve-free/upstreamable; the counting half `#E[n] = n²` (N10 (i)+(ii): degree + separability) stays open, see `notes/SEPARABILITY_ROUTES.md`)

Multiplication-by-2 `x`-coordinate formula in Mathlib's canonical division polynomials (`secp256k1_double_x_eq_Φ₂_div_Ψ₂Sq`: for a non-2-torsion point `P=(x,y)` on `y²=x³+7`, the doubled `x`-coordinate `addX x x (slope x x y y) = (Φ 2)(x)/(Ψ₂Sq)(x)` — with Mathlib's own `Φ`/`ΨSq` division polynomials, `Φ 2 = X⁴−56X` (`secp256k1_Φ₂`), `Ψ₂Sq = 4X³+28 = 4y²`. This is the base case `n=2` of the general multiplication formula `x([n]P)=Φₙ/ΨSqₙ` — the engine of the general `ψₙ`-vanishing ⟺ `n`-torsion bridge (`notes/FOUNDATIONS.md` rung 4). Unlike the per-`n` bridges (which used ad-hoc reduced polynomials like `3x⁴+84x`), this states the *canonical* `Φₙ/ΨSqₙ` shape. The general-`n` formula, by induction on the division-polynomial recurrence, is the missing Mathlib rung — absent from v4.31, present only in a stalled upstream PR)

Multiplication-by-2 `y`-coordinate formula `y(2•P) = ω₂/(2y)³` (N7-uniform S3a base) (`secp256k1_double_y_eq_ω₂`: for a non-2-torsion point `P=(x,y)` on `y²=x³+7`, the doubled `y`-coordinate `addY x x y (slope x x y y) = (x⁶ + 140x³ − 392)/(2y)³` — the `y`-analogue of the `n=2` `x`-formula and the first `y`-coordinate division-polynomial value in the repo, i.e. `y(2•P) = ω₂/ψ₂³` with `ψ₂ = 2y` and the `n=2` `y`-coordinate ("omega") polynomial `ω₂ = x⁶ + 140x³ − 392`. Mathlib has no `ω` division polynomial (open `TODO`); the value is derived from the group law's doubling `addY` and closed by one certified `linear_combination` against the curve equation and the slope relation `2y·ℓ = 3x²`. Base case of node S3a of the N7-uniform build (`BARRIERS.md §B3`; target `n7_uniform_secp256k1_x`). Honest scope: fixed `n=2` coordinate identity only; the uniform `y([n]P)=ωₙ/ψₙ³` and the general bivariate `ωₙ` remain open. No `native_decide`, no new axioms)

Multiplication-by-3 `x`-coordinate formula for secp256k1 — `x(3•P) = Φ₃/ΨSq₃` (`secp256k1_triple_x_eq_Φ₃_div_ΨSq₃`: for `P=(x,y)` on `y²=x³+7` with `y≠0`, `Ψ₃(x)≠0`, and the chord-tangent slopes `s₂` (`2y·s₂=3x²`) / `s₃` (secant `2P→P`, the `FiveTorsionBridge` parametrisation), the tripled `x`-coordinate `s₃²−(s₂²−2x)−x = (Φ 3)(x)/(ΨSq 3)(x)` in Mathlib's canonical division polynomials. Node N7@3 — extends the `n=2` case `secp256k1_double_x_eq_Φ₂_div_Ψ₂Sq`, connecting the concrete `Φ₃`/`ΨSq₃` forms to the actual elliptic-curve group law. Proof mirrors `five_core`: square the secant relation to clear `s₃`, then a CAS-derived `linear_combination` of the slope + curve equations after clearing `(2y)⁴`; certificate `scripts/certs/triple_mult_formula_check.py` (`CERT_OK`). No `native_decide`)

Multiplication-by-3 `y`-coordinate formula `y(3•P) = ω₃/ψ₃³` (N7-uniform S3a) (`secp256k1_triple_y_eq_ω₃`: in the chord-tangent slope parametrisation `s₂` (`2y·s₂=3x²`), `s₃` (`(s₂²−3x)·s₃ = −(s₂(s₂²−3x)+y)−y`) of the `x`-triple, the tripled `y`-coordinate `s₃·(s₂²−s₃²)−y` equals `ω₃/(3x⁴+84x)³` with the `n=3` `y`-coordinate ("omega") polynomial `ω₃ = y·(x¹²+1540x⁹−87024x⁶−109760x³−1229312)` — bivariate, the `y` factor being the odd-`n` shape. Companion to the `x`-triple `x(3•P)=Φ₃/ΨSq₃` and extends the `n=2` `y`-formula. Mathlib has no `ω` division polynomial (open `TODO`). Proof mirrors the `x`-triple: Step A clears `s₃` via `hℓ3` into an `s₃`-free `W`-expression, Step B is the `s₃`-free master identity cleared by `(2y)³` (CAS-derived `linear_combination` cofactors), then cancel `(s₂²−3x)³`. Honest scope: fixed `n=3` coordinate identity; the uniform `y([n]P)=ωₙ/ψₙ³` remains open. No `native_decide`, no new axioms)

N7-uniform ω-free base: joint `(x,y)` carrier rungs `n=1,2` + ω-recurrence anchors (secp256k1) (`secp256k1_one_nsmul_coords` / `secp256k1_two_nsmul_coords_ωfree`: the `n=1,2` base cases of the joint carrier — whenever `n•P=(X,Y)` is affine, `X=Φₙ(x)/ΨSqₙ(x)` and the ω-free `y`-relation `Y·(4y)·ψₙ(P)³ = ψ(n+2)ψ(n−1)² − ψ(n−2)ψ(n+1)²`; and `secp256k1_omega_recurrence_two`/`_three`: that ω-recurrence numerator equals `4y·ωₙ` at `n=2,3`, cross-checking the group-law-derived `ω₂,ω₃`. The `y`-conjunct uses only Mathlib's `ψ` — no `ω` division polynomial. Honest scope: base leaves + anchors only; the uniform induction over all `n` stays the open target `n7_uniform_secp256k1_x` (`Ecdlp/Targets/n7_uniform_carrier_induction.lean`, whose `normEDSRec'` reduction to these leaves + named residual walls is machine-checked). These four secp256k1 forms inherit `Lean.ofReduceBool` from the secp256k1 primality/coefficient facts (`native_decide`); no *new* axioms beyond the trusted base)

N7@4 — multiplication-by-4 `x`-coordinate formula: `x(4•P) = Φ₄(x)/ΨSq₄(x)` (`secp256k1_quadruple_x_eq_Φ₄_div_ΨSq₄`: whenever `4•P` is an affine point `(X,Y)`, `X = (Φ 4)(x)/(ΨSq 4)(x)` with the degree-16 monic numerator `Φ₄(x) = x¹⁶ − 3808x¹³ + 144256x¹⁰ + 2985472x⁷ + 38108672x⁴ + 68841472x` and degree-15 denominator `ΨSq₄ = preΨ₄²·Ψ₂Sq` — the even rung `n = 4` of the N7 ladder (`n = 2, 3, 4, 5`). The generic branch runs doubling-of-doubling (`4P = 2·(2P)`, two tangents — vs. the odd chords), and its crux is that the outer doubling is the `n = 2` formula applied at `X2 = x(2P)`: `quad_x_core` chains `hInner` (the `n=2` identity `(s₄²−2X2)(4X2³+28) = X2⁴−56X2` at `X2`), `hBridge`, `hkey`; both 2-torsion escapes (`2P = O` or `2P` 2-torsion ⟹ `4P = O`) contradict an affine `4P`. Eval forms via Mathlib `Φ_ofNat`/`ΨSq_ofNat`/`preΨ'_even`; `Φ₄`/`ΨSq₄` independently verified against from-scratch division polynomials + 2-prime numeric `x(4P)` check (`scripts/certs/quad_mult_formula_check.py`, `CERT_OK`))

N7@4 — multiplication-by-4 `y`-coordinate formula `y(4•P) = ω₄/ψ₄³` + fully closed `carrier_four` leaf (`secp256k1_quadruple_y`: whenever `4•P` is an affine point `(X,Y)`, `Y·ψ₄³ = ω₄(x)` with `ψ₄ = (2x⁶+280x³−784)(2y)` and the degree-24 `ω₄(x) = x²⁴+8624x²¹−2875712x¹⁸−16946944x¹⁵−1054135040x¹²−35487778816x⁹−229379784704x⁶−701632282624x³−188900999168` — the `y`-companion of the landed `x(4P)=Φ₄/ΨSq₄`, and the `n=4` analogue of `y(2P)=ω₂/(2y)³` / `y(3P)=ω₃/ψ₃³`. The core `quad_y_core` runs doubling-of-doubling (tangents `s₂` at `P`, `s₄` at `2P`) and closes by three CAS-designed `linear_combination` certificates assembled via the exact identity `(2Y2)³·4096y¹² = ψ₄³`. Fed by the freshly-derived even-index brick `secp256k1_psi6_evalEval` (`ψ6 = 2y·(3x¹⁶+4704x¹³−131712x¹⁰−7639296x⁷−12907776x⁴−103262208x)`) and its anchor `secp256k1_omega_recurrence_four` (`ψ₆ψ₃²−ψ₂ψ₅² = 4y·ω₄`), it reshapes into the joint ω-free carrier leaf `secp256k1_four_nsmul_coords_ωfree`, which closes `carrier_four` (both conjuncts) in the uniform induction stem — the `n=4` (even) base rung of `n7_uniform_secp256k1_x`. `ω₄`/`ψ₆` CAS-validated (on-curve `(A,B)` representation) + 10-prime numeric `Y(4P)·ψ₄³=ω₄` check. Honest scope: fixed `n=4`; the uniform induction over all `n` stays open. No `native_decide`, no new axioms)

N7@5 — multiplication-by-5 `x`-coordinate formula: `x(5•P) = Φ₅(x)/ΨSq₅(x)` (`secp256k1_quintuple_x_eq_Φ₅_div_ΨSq₅`: whenever `5•P` is an affine point `(X,Y)`, then `X = (Φ 5)(x)/(ΨSq 5)(x)` — the degree-25 numerator over `preΨ₅²`, again with no side conditions: the generic branch adds `3P + 2P` — a chord between two nontrivial multiples, prototyping the addition step of the general N7 engine — through `quint_x_core` (12 `linear_combination` certificates incl. a 94+55-monomial master, designed by cofactor-tracked elimination of the three slopes `s₅, s₃, s₂`, kernel-re-verified); the 2-torsion branch (`5P = P`) and 3-torsion branch (`5P = 2P`, reduced to the `n = 2` formula) hold via `Ψ₂Sq ⊥ preΨ₅` / `Ψ₃ ⊥ preΨ₅` certificates. `Φ 5`/`ΨSq 5` eval forms derived through Mathlib's `Φ_ofNat`/`ΨSq_ofNat`/`preΨ'_even` recurrences (`preΨ₆ = Ψ₃(preΨ₅ − preΨ₄²)`). All certificates + 25-point (and independent 40-point, different prime) numeric checks: `scripts/certs/quint_mult_formula_check.py` (`CERT_OK`). N7 ladder now `n = 2, 3, 5`)

NIST P-256 base point has exact order `n` (weak point-counting keystone) (`p256_generator_addOrderOf`: the SEC 2 generator `G=(Gx,Gy)` in Mathlib's point group has `addOrderOf G = n`, so `⟨G⟩` is cyclic of order `n` — the crypto subgroup pinned WITHOUT computing `#E(𝔽_p)` (no Hasse/Schoof). Proof: `n•G=0` (native double-and-add over 𝔽_p) + `G≠0`, `n` prime ⇒ `addOrderOf_eq_prime`. Mirrors secp256k1's `GeneratorOrder.lean`; server-verified on the warm Lean toolchain then CI. Does NOT give the strong keystone `#E=n`)

NIST P-256 field prime `p` is prime (Pratt certificate) (`p256_p_prime`: full recursive Pratt / `lucas_primality` certificate for `p = 2²⁵⁶−2²²⁴+2¹⁹²+2⁹⁶−1`, 9 recursive nodes, witness `a=6`. Discharges the `[Fact p.Prime]` hypothesis, so P-256's `IsElliptic` instance and Mathlib group law become unconditional — exactly as for secp256k1. The second curve's primality via the *same* generator `scripts/pratt_certificate.py`, the honest cross-domain proof that the machinery is curve-agnostic)

NIST P-256 group order `n` is prime (Pratt certificate) (`p256_n_prime`: full recursive Pratt / `lucas_primality` certificate for the base-point order `n`, 10 recursive nodes, witness `a=7`. Gives `[Fact n.Prime]` for P-256, the foundation for its prime-order group structure — the analogue of secp256k1's `Secp256k1PrimeN`. Both P-256 primes (`p`, `n`) now proved by the same curve-agnostic generator)

NIST P-256 has no small embedding degree (MOV/Frey–Rück resistance) (`p256_embedding_degree_gt_100`: for every `1 ≤ k ≤ 100`, `p^k ≢ 1 (mod n)`, so P-256's embedding degree exceeds 100 — the MOV/FR pairing transfer would need an intractable `𝔽_{p^k}`, `k>100`. The second live domain's first attack-boundary rung, mirroring secp256k1's `EmbeddingDegree.lean`; pure modular arithmetic on the verified primes `p`, `n`)

NIST P-256 is a genuine elliptic curve (`P256_Δ_ne_zero` + `IsElliptic` instance: `y²=x³−3x+b` over `𝔽_p`, `p=2²⁵⁶−2²²⁴+2¹⁹²+2⁹⁶−1`, discriminant a unit — demonstrates the secp256k1 Mathlib grounding is curve-agnostic, same machinery gives P-256 the formalized group law, under the published `[Fact p.Prime]`)

NIST P-256 is ordinary, non-anomalous, Hasse-consistent (Smart/SSSA boundary) (`p256_trace_ordinary_nonanomalous`: with `#E=n`, the trace `t=p+1−n` satisfies `t≠0` (not supersingular), `t≠1` (not anomalous — Smart/SSSA inapplicable), `t²≤4p` (Hasse; `t` is 127-bit, cofactor 1). The second live domain's SSSA boundary rung, mirroring secp256k1's `TraceOfFrobenius.lean`; conditional on the published `#E=n` as for secp256k1)

NIST P-256 quadratic-twist security certificate — cross-curve companion of the secp256k1 twist limitation (`p256_twist_security_profile`: the number `2p+2−n` factors exactly as `3·5·13·179·Q` with `Q` a 241-bit prime (`p256_twist_maxprime_prime`, full Pratt certificate; `p256_twist_order_factorization`). Honest scope: interpreting `2p+2−n` as the twist order `#Ẽ = p+1+t` rests on `#E = n`, which for P-256 is NOT in-repo (only `n ∣ #E` is proved; parked on Hasse) — the theorems themselves are unconditional arithmetic about the literal number. Consequences: (1) cofactor `3·5·13·179 = 34905 ≈ 2¹⁵ > 1` — the twist has small-order subgroups; (2) `2²⁴⁰ < Q < 2²⁴¹`, so generic twist-DLP `≈ √Q ≈ 2¹²⁰ < 2¹²⁸` — the machine-checked form of the publicly tabulated ~2^120.3 P-256 twist-security figure. Cross-curve: secp256k1's twist (`2¹¹⁰`, cofactor `2³⁷`) is weaker than P-256's (`2¹²⁰`, cofactor `2¹⁵`); point validation mandatory for `x`-only code on both. Inherits `Lean.ofReduceBool` from `native_decide` + Pratt)

Necessary infinity-stratum pruning of the exact stage-14 chart cover (the three one-infinity specializations of the local triquadratic `H` are squared projective determinants, while `H([1:0],q,[1:0]) = q.v^2`. Hence, when all external inputs are affine, adjacent intermediate infinity slots are impossible and the exact chart cover restricts from all `2^14 = 16384` masks to the 987 separated subsets of the fourteen-slot path. Selected boundary infinities satisfy exact endpoint determinant equations; if both endpoint determinants are nonzero, slots 0 and 13 are affine and the conditional exact cover has 377 masks. An isolated infinity slot also forces each existing affine neighbor to the normalized current-input coordinate. Honest scope: the predicates are proved necessary, not sufficient or unique; the 987 and 377 families are logical cover counts and are not production-enumerated. This theorem-only result claims no mask-selection algorithm, independent relations, relation yield, rank, solver readiness or run, recovery, memory, runtime, total-cost advantage, exact-target computation, or ECDLP attack. The three cardinalities are compiler-trusted through `native_decide`; the identities, necessity and forced-neighbor theorems, and cover equivalences use the standard Lean/Mathlib trust base)

Node N5 closed — `Φ n ⊥ ΨSq n` for secp256k1, every `n : ℤ` (`secp256k1_isCoprime_Φ_ΨSq`: `IsCoprime (secp256k1.Φ n) (secp256k1.ΨSq n)` over `𝔽_p[X]` for all `n` — the highest-value unblocked node of the ψₙ↔E[n] bridge toward the counting half `#E[n]=n²` (N10(i)). A non-coprimality feeds the landed eval-bridge descent `secp256k1_exists_normEDS_consecutive_eq_zero_of_not_isCoprime` to two consecutive scalar-`normEDS` zeros, which Ward apparition rigidity `normEDS_not_consecutive_zeros` forbids; the two degeneracy escapes are killed by the `Ψ₂Sq⊥Ψ₃` and `Ψ₃⊥preΨ₄` Bézout certificates pushed to `𝔽̄_p`. No `char∤n` hypothesis; the same module also gives the closure form `secp256k1Bar_isCoprime_Φ_ΨSq` and the registered scalar target `secp256k1_normEDS_no_consecutive_zero`. No new `native_decide`, no new axioms; Split-PR 1 of `notes/reviews/PR172_SPLIT_PLAN.md`)

Number of generators of a cyclic group = `φ(n)` (`mov_random_q_success_probability`: in a cyclic group of order `n`, `#{g \| orderOf g = n} = φ(n)` — the count of full-order elements; underpins the MOV/Frey–Rück random-`Q` success probability `φ(n)/n`. Layer-3 generated, closed the last open Layer-3 `Targets/` stem of its batch (the intentional smoke stem stays open), corpus claim `mov-random-q-success-probability-006`)

P-256 base point on curve; constants validated (`P256_generator_equation`: the standard generator `G=(Gx,Gy)` satisfies P-256's equation in `𝔽_p` — one `native_decide` simultaneously validates `p`, `b`, `Gx`, `Gy`; a genuine rational point of the Mathlib curve)

P-256 has `c₄ ≠ 0`, hence `j ≠ 0` — no CM/GLV (structural contrast) (`P256_c₄_ne_zero`: `c₄=144≠0`, so unlike secp256k1 (`c₄=0`, `j=0`) P-256 has no complex multiplication by `ℤ[ζ₃]` and no GLV endomorphism. Makes concrete that secp256k1's `j=0`/CM structure is a *special* feature, not generic)

P-256 rational-point group is finite (`instFiniteP256Point`: `Finite P256.toAffine.Point`, now a one-line `inferInstance` corollary of the general `WeierstrassCurve.Affine.instFinitePoint` since `ZMod p` is a finite commutative ring. Makes Mathlib's `Nat.card E.toAffine.Point` a real quantity for P-256 rather than junk `0`. Pure-kernel, no native_decide)

Pohlig–Hellman: component depends only on `x mod d

Pohlig–Hellman: projection to order-`d` subgroup

Point decomposition ⇒ Semaev relation (index-calculus entry point) (`secp256k1_point_decomposition_semaev`: if a curve point `R` decomposes as a sum `R = P₁ + P₂` with `x(P₁) ≠ x(P₂)`, then `S₃(x(P₁), x(P₂), x(R)) = 0` — every 2-term decomposition of `R` lies on the Semaev variety. This is the structural reduction index calculus rests on: the search for decompositions is confined to the roots of a single codimension-1 polynomial condition, not the whole group. Proof recasts `R = P₁+P₂` as `P₁+P₂+(−R)=0` and uses `x(−R) = x(R)` (`Point.neg_some`) to hand off to `secp256k1_semaev_three_point`. Forward/structural half only — records *where* solutions live, not the cost of *finding* them; over `𝔽_p` that root-finding is the studied `Θ(√n)` barrier)

Point decomposition ⇒ Semaev relation — doubling case (`secp256k1_point_decomposition_semaev_double`: the `P₁ = P₂` companion — if `R = 2·P₁` with `P₁` not 2-torsion, then `S₃(x(P₁), x(P₁), x(R)) = 0`. With the generic-sum theorem, covers every 2-term decomposition of `R`)

Point-evaluated ω-free x-difference identity `φ_ψ_diff` at a point (N7-uniform odd-step brick, curve-generic) (`φ_ψ_diff_evalEval`: for an arbitrary Weierstrass curve `W` over any `CommRing R`, all `m n : ℤ` and every point `(x,y) : R`, `φₙ(P)·ψₘ(P)² − φₘ(P)·ψₙ(P)² = ψ(m+n)(P)·ψ(m−n)(P)` with `·(P) = evalEval x y` — the Silverman ω-free x-coordinate difference identity `φ_ψ_diff` transported from the bivariate ring `R[X][Y]` to a point by the `evalEval` ring hom. This is the scalar identity the open N7-uniform target's `odd_x_algebra` wall (`Ecdlp/Targets/n7_uniform_carrier_induction.lean`) reduces to at `(m,n)=(k+1,k)`: the secant `x`-coordinate of two consecutive multiples `kP,(k+1)P` pinned to the canonical ratio at index `2k+1`. Honest scope: the point-level identity only; closing the wall additionally needs the secant-`addX` algebra and the `Carrier` y-coupling that pins `Yₖ,Yₖ₊₁`. Proof: `congrArg (evalEval x y)` over the proved `φ_ψ_diff` + `evalEval_mul`/`sub`/`pow` distribution — the idiom of `OmegaRecurrenceAnchors`. No `native_decide`, no new axioms)

Point-level 3-torsion bridge `3•P = 0 ⟺ ψ₃(P)=0` (`secp256k1_three_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: for a nonzero affine `P=(x,y)` on secp256k1, the group relation `3•P=0` holds iff the 3-division polynomial vanishes — the full `ψ₃ ↔ E[3]` equivalence, upgrading the forward-only `Ψ₃`-root fact; original elementary proof via the doubling identity `addX−x = −(3x⁴+84x)/(4y²)`, the n=3 analogue of the n=2 bridge)

Point-level 4-torsion bridge `4•P = 0 ⟺ ψ₄(P)=0` (`secp256k1_four_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: for a nonzero affine `P=(x,y)` on secp256k1, `4•P=0` iff the 4-division polynomial vanishes — the even-index member of the `{2,3,5,7}` torsion-bridge family. Runs by doubling-of-doubling: `4•P=2•(2•P)`, so `4•P=0 ⟺ Y(2•P)=0` (2-torsion of the double, via `secp256k1_two_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`), and the landed doubling `y`-coordinate `Y(2•P)=ω₂/(2y)³` (`secp256k1_two_nsmul_coords`) gives `Y(2•P)=0 ⟺ ω₂(x)=0 ⟺ ψ₄(P)=4y·ω₂=0`, with `ω₂=x⁶+140x³−392`. The `n=4` non-degeneracy leaf of the uniform carrier. Inherits `Lean.ofReduceBool` from the `2≠0` fact (`native_decide`); no new axioms)

Point-level 5-torsion bridge `5•P = 0 ⟺ ψ₅(P)=0` (`secp256k1_five_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: for a nonzero affine `P=(x,y)` on secp256k1, `5•P=0` holds iff the 5-division polynomial vanishes — the full `ψ₅ ↔ E[5]` equivalence, the n=5 analogue of the n=2/n=3 bridges; original elementary proof via the route `5•P=0 ⟺ x(2P)=x(3P) ⟺ ψ₅=0`, the core `x`-difference identity designed by a sympy-verified certificate and re-checked by the Lean kernel; reuses the merged n=2/n=3 bridges to close the degenerate branches)

Point-level 7-torsion bridge `7•P = 0 ⟺ ψ₇(P)=0` (`secp256k1_seven_nsmul_eq_zero_iff`: for a nonzero affine `P=(x,y)` on secp256k1, `7•P=0` holds iff the 7-division polynomial vanishes — the full `ψ₇ ↔ E[7]` equivalence, the n=7 analogue of the n=2/n=3/n=5 bridges; original elementary proof via the route `7•P=0 ⟺ x(3P)=x(4P) ⟺ ψ₇=0`, the core slope-algebra identity designed by a sympy-verified certificate and re-checked by the Lean kernel; reuses the merged n=3 bridge to close the 3-torsion branch)

Point-level doubling `2•P = (Φ₂/Ψ₂Sq, ω₂/(2y)³)` on secp256k1's group (N7-uniform S3a) (`secp256k1_two_nsmul_coords`: for a nonsingular non-2-torsion `P=(x,y)` on `y²=x³+7`, if the double `2 • Point.some x y h` is the affine point `Point.some X Y h'` then both coordinates are pinned to their division-polynomial values: `X = Φ₂(x)/Ψ₂Sq(x)` and `Y = (x⁶+140x³−392)/(2y)³`. Connects the two landed coordinate identities to the actual group operation `2 • P` on `secp256k1.toAffine.Point` (via `two_nsmul` + `Point.add_self_of_Y_ne` + the doubled point's coordinate injectivity) — the `n=2` Point-level instance of the open target `n7_uniform_secp256k1_x` and the base case of node S3a of the N7-uniform build. Honest scope: fixed `n=2` only; the uniform statement for all `n` remains open. No `native_decide`, no new axioms)

Pollard rho: a collision exists within `card` steps (pigeonhole)

Projective smoothness of `Y²Z=X³+bZ³` — Jacobian criterion, Mathlib `Nonsingular` (`curveB_toProjective_nonsingular`: over any field with `2,3,b≠0`, every projective point `P≠0` on `Y²Z=X³+bZ³` is `WeierstrassCurve.Projective.Nonsingular` — obtained by rewriting `Nonsingular` to Mathlib's three `pderiv`-defined partials `−3X²`, `2YZ`, `Y²−3bZ²` via `nonsingular_iff`, then discharging the disjunction with the self-contained two-chart core `jacobian_core` (affine chart `Z≠0` + point at infinity `[0:1:0]`). Specialized to `b=7,𝔽_p` as `secp256k1_projective_nonsingular` and `secp256k1_infinity_nonsingular`; companion discriminant `curveB_Δ = −432b²`. FBL-PURE-001; no `native_decide`, no new axioms)

Reusable ≤2-to-1 torsion fiber-counting lemma (`secp256k1_torsion_ncard_le`: if every nonzero `n`-torsion `x`-coord lies in a finite set of size ≤ m, then `#{P | n•P=0} ≤ 2m+1` — at most two `y` per `x` on the curve, plus the identity; the general counting core behind the `#E[n] ≤ n²` bounds)

Schnorr/EdDSA signature correctness (completeness) `s·G = R + c·P

Semaev forward direction generalized to all `n` — the resultant recursion engine (`resultant_eq_zero_of_common_root`: for *any* two univariate polynomials `f, g` over a commutative ring sharing an evaluation-root `X₀` (`f(X₀) = g(X₀) = 0`), `Res(f,g,m,n) = 0`, provided the Sylvester sizes are not both zero. Every Semaev step `Sₙ₊₁ = Res_X(Sₙ(…,X), S₃(…,X))` inherits its forward direction from this one lemma at level `n`; `S₄_eq_zero_of_common_root` is now literally the instance `f = S₃(x₁,x₂,·)`, `g = S₃(x₃,x₄,·)`, and `S₅, S₆, …` are discharged verbatim with `f` the previous slice. The mechanism-level generalization of the Semaev forward direction to the whole infinite `Sₙ` family — via the Bézout identity `exists_mul_add_mul_eq_C_resultant`, over any commutative ring, no field or closure)

Semaev polynomial has degree exactly 2 in each variable (`secp256k1_S₃poly_natDegree`: for `x₁ ≠ x₂` over `𝔽_p`, `S₃(x₁,x₂,·)` is a degree-exactly-2 univariate polynomial, leading coefficient `(x₁−x₂)² ≠ 0`. Base case of the classical `deg_{xᵢ} Sₘ = 2^{m−2}` degree tower — the doubling that makes higher-order decompositions blow up. Via `Polynomial.natDegree_quadratic`)

Semaev's 3rd summation polynomial — forward direction (`S₃_eq_zero_of_chord`: for `y² = x³ + a·x + b` over a field, if `(x₁,y₁), (x₂,y₂)` are curve points with `x₁ ≠ x₂` and `x₃` is the `x`-coordinate of their chord-sum, then `S₃(x₁,x₂,x₃) = 0` — equivalently `P₁+P₂+P₃ = O ⇒ S₃ = 0`; `secp256k1_semaev_three_chord` specializes it to secp256k1 `y² = x³ + 7`. First Semaev summation polynomial formalized in Lean/Mathlib (a green-field `BARRIERS.md` item). Certificate designed + verified by exact symbolic elimination (sympy: Gröbner + iterated resultant), kernel-checked via `linear_combination`. A construction, not an attack — a necessary collinearity condition that by itself computes nothing about any discrete log)

Semaev's 4th summation polynomial `S₄` — definition + forward direction (`S₄ = Res_X(S₃(x₁,x₂,X), S₃(x₃,x₄,X))` via Mathlib's `Polynomial.resultant _ _ 2 2`; `S₄_eq_zero_of_common_root`: a shared root `X₀` of the two `S₃` slices — e.g. `X₀ = x(P₁+P₂) = x(P₃+P₄)` — forces `S₄ = 0`, over any commutative ring, via the resultant Bézout identity `exists_mul_add_mul_eq_C_resultant`. `secp256k1_semaev_four_of_common_root` specializes to secp256k1. The first rung above `S₃` — the recursion index calculus over `𝔽_{p^k}` uses. First `S₄` in Lean)

Semaev's `S₃` on actual secp256k1 curve points (`secp256k1_semaev_three_point`: for genuine points of the Mathlib elliptic curve `secp256k1.toAffine.Point`, the group relation `P₁+P₂+P₃ = O` with `x(P₁) ≠ x(P₂)` implies `S₃(x₁,x₂,x₃) = 0`. Connects the abstract chord identity to Mathlib's formalized elliptic-curve group law by unfolding `Point.add_of_X_ne` / `slope` / `addX` to recover `x₃ = x(P₁+P₂)` — the honest statement whose hypothesis is the actual curve addition, not a raw coordinate equation)

Semaev's `S₃` on actual secp256k1 points — tangent case (`secp256k1_semaev_three_point_double`: the `P₁ = P₂` companion — for genuine points of `secp256k1.toAffine.Point`, `2•P₁ + P₃ = O` with `P₁` not 2-torsion (`y₁ ≠ negY x₁ y₁`) implies `S₃(x₁,x₁,x₃) = 0`, via Mathlib's tangent doubling `Point.add_of_Y_ne`. With the chord point theorem, the `S₃` forward direction now holds on Mathlib's actual elliptic-curve group law in every nondegenerate case)

Semaev's `S₃` — full characterization (iff) (`S₃_eq_zero_iff`: for on-curve `(x₁,y₁), (x₂,y₂)` with `x₁ ≠ x₂`, `S₃(x₁,x₂,x₃) = 0 ⟺ (x₁−x₂)²(x₁+x₂+x₃) = (y₂−y₁)² ∨ = (y₂+y₁)²` — i.e. `x₃` is the `x`-coordinate of `P₁+P₂` or of `P₁−P₂`; `secp256k1_semaev_three_iff` specializes to secp256k1. Combines forward + reverse: the complete statement of `S₃` as the elimination of `y₁,y₂` from "three points sum to `O`")

Semaev's `S₃` — reverse direction (the two roots) (`S₃_root_of_eq_zero`: `S₃` is quadratic in `x₃` with leading coefficient `(x₁−x₂)²`; if `(x₁,y₁), (x₂,y₂)` lie on `y² = x³ + a·x + b` and `S₃(x₁,x₂,x₃) = 0`, then `(x₁−x₂)²·x₃` equals `(y₂−y₁)² − (x₁+x₂)(x₁−x₂)²` or `(y₂+y₁)² − (x₁+x₂)(x₁−x₂)²` — the cleared `x`-coordinates of `P₁+P₂` and `P₁−P₂`. Via a sympy-certified master factorization `(x₁−x₂)²·S₃ = (D·x₃−R₊)(D·x₃−R₋)`, a pure `ring` identity, then `mul_eq_zero`; needs no `x₁ ≠ x₂`)

Semaev's `S₃` — tangent / doubling case (`S₃_eq_zero_of_tangent`: the `x₁ = x₂` companion of the chord case — if `(x₁,y₁)` is a curve point and `x₃` is the `x`-coordinate of `2·(x₁,y₁)` (cleared doubling form `4·y₁²·(x₃+2·x₁) = (3·x₁²+a)²`), then `S₃(x₁,x₁,x₃) = 0`; `secp256k1_semaev_three_tangent` specializes to secp256k1. With the chord case this completes the `S₃` forward direction in every nondegenerate case. No `y₁·y₂` cross term arises, so a single certified `linear_combination` suffices)

Semaev's `S₄` — reverse/meaning direction (`S₄_common_root_of_eq_zero`: over a field, for on-curve `(x₁,y₁), (x₂,y₂)` with `x₁ ≠ x₂` and `S₄(x₁,x₂,x₃,x₄) = 0`, the two `S₃` slices share a root `X₀` in the field — the converse of `S₄_eq_zero_of_common_root`. Since `S₄` is the resultant, its vanishing forces a shared root; it lies *in* `K` because `S₃(x₁,x₂,·)` splits with the explicitly known roots `x(P₁±P₂)`. Via `resultant_eq_prod_eval`; `secp256k1_semaev_four_common_root_of_eq_zero` specializes. With the forward direction, `S₄` now holds both ways)

Shamir secret-sharing reconstruction (`shamir_reconstruct`: for a degree-`<t` sharing polynomial `f` and `t = #s` distinct nodes, `f.eval 0` (the secret) `= (Lagrange.interpolate s v (f.eval ∘ v)).eval 0` — the information-theoretic recovery direction of Shamir's `(t,n)` SSS; secret = `f(0)`, shares = `(vᵢ, f(vᵢ))`)

Somos-4 recurrence for `normEDS` (`normEDS_somos4`: `normEDS(m+2)·normEDS(m−2) = b²·normEDS(m+1)·normEDS(m−1) − c·normEDS(m)²` for all `m:ℤ` over any `CommRing` — the `n=2` slice of Ward's master recurrence and the companion identity for the open Mathlib TODO "`normEDS` is elliptic"; single-parameter `normEDSRec'` strong induction, `b²`-cancellation over the domain `MvPolynomial (Fin 3) ℤ`, reflected by `normEDS_neg` and transported to any `CommRing` via `map_normEDS`; second upstream-Mathlib stepping stone toward L4, see `notes/L4_WARD_INDUCTION.md`)

Squarefree division polynomials `ψₙ` over `𝔽_p`, `n∈{3,4,5,7}` (`secp256k1_isCoprime_Ψ₃_derivative` + `preΨ₄`/`preΨ₅`/`preΨ₇` analogues: `IsCoprime ψₙ (derivative ψₙ)` over `𝔽_p` — the field squarefreeness certificate for the small division polynomials (incl. the even-index primitive-4-division `preΨ₄`, `secp256k1_isCoprime_preΨ₄_derivative`), node B4 at small `n`, via explicit extended-Euclid Bézout certificates `u·ψₙ+v·ψₙ′=1`. Scope is purely the `𝔽_p`-polynomial fact — no `𝔽̄_p`, no root count, no torsion is asserted here; the downstream `𝔽̄_p` root-count consumes exactly this. `native_decide` residue certs, no new axioms; general-`n` B4 open)

S₃`-slice two-root factorization over `F[X]` (`S₃poly_master_factor`: `(x₁−x₂)²·S₃poly = (D·X − R₊)·(D·X − R₋)` as a polynomial identity in `F[X]` — the lift of the scalar master factorization, exhibiting `S₃`'s degree-2 slice as split with the explicit roots `x(P₁±P₂)`; the key input to the `S₄` reverse)

Taproot key-tweak verification (BIP-341 key-path spend, `Q=P+t·G`)

The concrete secp256k1 subgroup `⟨G⟩` is a `ZMod n`-module (`secp256k1_grp_nsmul_eq_zero`: every point of `⟨G⟩ = zmultiples secp256k1G` is annihilated by `n`, so `⟨G⟩` carries a `Module (ZMod n)` structure built via `AddCommGroup.zmodModule`. This realises the abstract discrete-log model on a genuine elliptic-curve group — Mathlib provides no automatic `ZMod n`-module on a cyclic subgroup; it must be constructed from the exponent bound, which the weak keystone `addOrderOf secp256k1G = n` supplies. The bridge that lets every abstract protocol theorem instantiate on real `WeierstrassCurve.Affine.Point` values)

The discrete-log map is a group isomorphism `ZMod n ≃+ ⟨G⟩` (`secp256k1_dlogEquiv`: base-point multiplication `c ↦ c·G` is an additive-group isomorphism between the scalar ring `ZMod n` and the concrete secp256k1 subgroup `⟨G⟩` — the exact group-theoretic content of the ECDLP setting: the discrete log `dlog = (c ↦ c·G)⁻¹` is a well-defined bijection. Its *computational* inversion is the open ECDLP hardness conjecture; this asserts only the unconditional bijection, via injective (`c.val < n = addOrderOf G`) + surjective (`zmultiples`) on the `ZMod n`-module `⟨G⟩`. Built with `AddEquiv.ofBijective`)

The exact curve cardinality `#E(𝔽_p) = n` — cofactor 1, without Hasse or Schoof (`secp256k1_card_point_eq_n`: `Nat.card secp256k1.toAffine.Point = Secp256k1.n`). A curve-specific certificate that upgrades `n ∣ #E` to equality using the special structure of `E : Y² = X³ + 7` over `p ≡ 1 (mod 3)`: `#E ≤ 2p+1` (`secp256k1_card_point_le`, ≤2 `y` per `x`) and `2p+1 < 3n` force `#E ∈ {n, 2n}`; `2n` (even) is excluded because additive Cauchy would yield a nonzero 2-torsion point, but `E[2] = {O}` (`secp256k1_no_nonzero_two_torsion`: `2•P=0 ⟹ P=0`, since `y=0 ⟹ x³=−7` and `−7` is not a cube in `𝔽_p`, `(−7)^((p−1)/3)≠1`). Removes the last standing assumption behind Units 1–2 (the published order `n` as `#E`). Uses `native_decide` for the 256-bit non-cube leaf and the literal arithmetic (`Lean.ofReduceBool`); numeric facts independently re-checked in `scripts/certs/cardinality_secp256k1.py`, prints `CERT_OK`)

The full point-group structure theorem: `E(𝔽_p) ≃+ ℤ/n` (`secp256k1_pointGroupEquiv`: base-point multiplication `c ↦ c·G` is an additive-group isomorphism from the scalar ring `ZMod n` onto the entire rational-point group `E(𝔽_p)`, not merely `⟨G⟩`. Lifts the subgroup discrete-log iso `secp256k1_dlogEquiv` off `⟨G⟩` by transporting across cofactor 1 `⟨G⟩ = ⊤` (`AddEquiv.addSubgroupCongr secp256k1_grp_eq_top`) then stripping the `⊤` subtype (`AddSubgroup.topEquiv`). The complete group-theoretic classification of secp256k1's points: cyclic of order `n`, i.e. `≅ ℤ/n`. Unconditional given `#E = n`; computational inversion is the open ECDLP conjecture, the bijection is a theorem. Inherits `Lean.ofReduceBool` through the order keystone)

The secp256k1 crypto subgroup `⟨G⟩` is cyclic of order exactly `n` (`secp256k1_grp_card`: `Nat.card ⟨G⟩ = n`, from `Nat.card (zmultiples g) = addOrderOf g` + the weak keystone; `secp256k1_grp_isAddCyclic`: `IsAddCyclic ⟨G⟩`. The group-object-level statement of "⟨G⟩ is a concrete cyclic group of order `n`" — no Hasse/`#E`, only `addOrderOf G = n`)

The whole point group equals `⟨G⟩` — `E(𝔽_p)` is cyclic, `glvPoint = [λ]` unconditional (`secp256k1_grp_eq_top`: `secp256k1Grp = ⊤`, from `#⟨G⟩ = n = #E` via `AddSubgroup.eq_top_of_card_eq`). Upgrades every `⟨G⟩`-only result to the full rational-point group now that `#E = n` is proved: `secp256k1_point_isAddCyclic` (`IsAddCyclic E(𝔽_p)`, an instance), `secp256k1_mem_zmultiples` (every point is a multiple of `G`), and `secp256k1_glvHom_eq_zsmul_unconditional` (the GLV eigenvalue property with the `[IsAddCyclic]` hypothesis now discharged — `glvHom = [k]` with `k²+k+1` annihilating every point, no remaining hypotheses). Resolves the `⟨G⟩`-vs-`E(𝔽_p)` scope ambiguity. Pure-kernel on top of the keystone

Tight `#E[2] ≤ 4` point-cardinality bound (`secp256k1_two_torsion_ncard_le`: `Set.ncard {P \| 2•P=0} ≤ 4` — the tight `(ℤ/2)²` ceiling, closing an asserted-but-unproven gap where only the x-coordinate bound existed; the 2-torsion `y=0` fiber is 1-to-1, giving 4 not the generic ≤ 7)

Tight `#E[4](𝔽_p) ≤ 16` point-cardinality bound (`secp256k1_four_torsion_ncard_le`: `Set.ncard {P \| 4•P=0} ≤ 16 = 4²` — the even-index entry of the `#E[n]` count family, at the tight value. `n=4` mixes self-paired 2-torsion (`y=0`) with `±y`-paired primitive 4-torsion, so instead of the generic `≤2m+1` we split `E[4] = E[2] ⊔ P₄` (`P₄ = {4•P=0, 2•P≠0}`): `#E[2] ≤ 4` (`secp256k1_two_torsion_ncard_le`) + a `≤2`-to-`1` fiber count `#P₄ ≤ 12` over the six `preΨ₄`-roots — via the 4-torsion bridge `4•P=0 ⟺ ψ₄=0` and `ψ₄=4y·(x⁶+140x³−392)`, a primitive point (`2•P≠0`⟹`y≠0`) forces `preΨ₄(x)=0`. `4+12=16`. Finiteness from the global `Finite W.Point` instance; reuses the `px`/`py` curve-fiber machinery of `TorsionPointCount`. The even-index tight companion of `#E[3]≤9`/`#E[5]≤25`/`#E[7]≤49`)

Torsion intersection = gcd (`secp256k1_torsionBy_inf_eq_gcd`: `E[m] ⊓ E[n] = E[gcd m n]` — the full lattice identity generalizing the coprime-disjoint leaf; via the `addOrderOf ∣ ·` characterization of `torsionBy`)

Universal frozen `C16 → C2` projective witness-chain extraction (the actual universal binary output of `frozenC k s` is homogeneous of declared degree `2^(s+1)`, so its predecessor homogenization evaluates exactly as direct projective specialization for every valid `[U:V]`; the local degree-two homogenization evaluates exactly as literal `H`. Over an algebraically closed target field, vanishing of every mapped `frozenC k s` is iff a minimal left-associated `FrozenProjectiveChain`; at `s = 14`, `C16` uses leaves `q 0` through `q 15` and fourteen valid intermediate projective slots. `[0:0]` is excluded by type and `[1:0]` is allowed at every level. Honest scope: witnesses live in the algebraically closed target; no base-field descent, direct-S17, `RatCat`, `Recover`, system-materialization, rank, yield, or cost result is claimed)

W3 closed at the function-field level — `RegularAt` and evaluation of abstract elements (`FunctionFieldRegular.lean`: the `RegularAt` predicate (`∃ a b, evalAt b ≠ 0 ∧ f = a/b`), the unique value `evalReg` with its defining lemmas, and the two-way bridge to the localization: an element of `Localization.AtPrime (XYIdeal P)` maps to a `RegularAt` function (via `IsLocalization.surj` + `evalAt_ker` rewriting `b ∉ XYIdeal ⟺ evalAt b ≠ 0`), and conversely a regular presentation determines a localization element (`IsLocalization.mk'`), with the payoff weld `evalRatAt = evalReg` on the overlap. With this, every abstract function-field element regular at `P` has a well-defined value at `P` — the W3 evaluation half is closed end-to-end (`evalAt → evalRatAt → evalFracAt → a/b extraction → RegularAt`); next: `f_P(D_Q)` divisor evaluation and W4 reciprocity)

W3 evaluation layer completed at the fraction level — `evalFracAt` + the Miller-representative nonvanishing (`evalFracAt h a b := evalAt h a / evalAt h b` with the representation-independence core `evalFracAt_well_defined` (cross-multiplication `a₁b₂ = a₂b₁` + nonvanishing denominators ⟹ equal values — transported through the ring hom `evalAt`, no domain instance needed), Miller-loop multiplicativity `evalFracAt_mul`, unit facts (`evalAt_unit_ne_zero`: coordinate-ring units never vanish at rational points; `evalFracAt_unit_mul`), and the bridge to the localization layer `evalRatAt_eq_evalFracAt` (an `a/b` presentation of a rational function regular at `P` evaluates identically under the residue map). Plus the secp256k1 Miller-layer theorem `secp256k1_miller_eval_scaling`: the W2 Miller-function representative ambiguity is a globally nonvanishing unit factor at every rational point — the well-definedness seed for the eventual `eₙ`. Honest scope: extracting an `a/b` presentation from an abstract `FunctionField` element is the documented next rung; curve-agnostic sections PR-able)

Ward apparition rigidity — `normEDS` has no two consecutive zeros (`normEDS_not_consecutive_zeros`: over any integral domain, given `¬(b=0∧c=0)` and `¬(c=0∧d=0)`, `normEDS b c d` never vanishes at two consecutive integers — the scalar core of node N5; composed with the eval-bridge global descent it discharges `IsCoprime(Φₙ,ΨSqₙ)`. Minimal-zero rank-of-apparition argument via `normEDS_isEllSequence`'s `r=1` translation identity + `normEDS_odd`/`normEDS_neg`; upstream-Mathlib candidate, no `native_decide`, no new axioms; supporting helpers `normEDS_shift_mul_shift_of_eq_zero`/`normEDS_sub_eq_zero_of_eq_zero`/`normEDS_not_consecutive_zeros'` in the same file)

Weil W3 — nonvanishing criterion at a point (`evalRatAt_ne_zero_iff_isUnit`: a rational function regular at `P` is nonzero at `P` iff it is a unit of the local ring `F[E]_P` — exactly the condition to evaluate a Miller function `f_P` to a nonzero value in `𝔽_p`, off its zero/pole support. Completes the *point-evaluation* half of Weil rung W3; `f_P(D_Q)` over a whole divisor and Weil reciprocity (W4) remain genuine Mathlib gaps — see `BARRIERS.md`)

Weil W3 — zero locus of point-evaluation (`evalRatAt_eq_zero_iff`: a rational function regular at `P` vanishes at `P` iff it lies in the maximal ideal of the local ring `F[E]_P`. From `evalRatAt = residueFieldEquiv ∘ residue`: residue-field iso injective, so `evalRatAt r = 0 ↔ residue r = 0 ↔ r ∈ 𝔪`)

Weil ladder W3e-1 — divisor evaluation `f((Q)−(O))` is multiplicative in the function (`divEval_mul`: for `f, g` regular at both `Q` and `O`, `divEval (f·g) = divEval f · divEval g`, where `divEval f := evalReg f Q / evalReg f O` is the value of `f` at the degree-0 divisor `(Q)−(O)`; via the pointwise multiplicativity `evalReg_mul` — `evalReg (f·g) = evalReg f · evalReg g` at a point, from `evalReg_eq` + `evalFracAt_mul`. The homomorphism property that makes `f_P(D_Q)` a map `E → μₙ` in the Weil pairing; first evaluation-half rung of `notes/WEIL_LADDER.md`)

Weil ladder W3e-2 — how the Miller representative enters `divEval`, and conditional representative-independence (`divEval_smul_unit`: for `g = u·f` with `u` a unit of `F[E]` and `f, g` regular at `Q, O`, `divEval g = (u(Q)/u(O)) · divEval f` — the entire dependence of `divEval` on the choice of Miller function is the single ratio `u(Q)/u(O)`, from the pointwise `evalReg_smul_unit` = `evalReg (u·f) = u(P)·evalReg f` via `evalFracAt_unit_mul`; and `divEval_smul_unit_eq`: if additionally `u(Q) = u(O)` the ratio is `1`, so `divEval g = divEval f`. secp256k1 forms `secp256k1_divEval_miller_rep_scaling`/`_indep` apply this to the `secp256k1_miller_function_unique` ambiguity. Honest scope: unconditional independence needs `u(Q)=u(O)`, i.e. that units of `F[E]` are constants — absent from Mathlib v4.31, carried as an explicit hypothesis, not proved)

Weil ladder W3e-3 — the raw pairing value's domain (support-disjointness bridge) + the `divEval` unit law (`secp256k1_miller_jointly_regular`: a Miller function `f` for `(P,n)` has a fixed presentation `a/b`, and at any two points `A, B` where the single denominator `b` does not vanish — i.e. `A, B` off `supp(div f)` — `f` is regular at both, the joint-regularity hypothesis `divEval hA hB` consumes, from one geometric condition; and `divEval_one`/`evalReg_one`: `divEval 1 ((A)−(B)) = 1`, which with `divEval_mul` makes `divEval` a monoid hom on the functions regular at both points. Closes the reachable W3-evaluation scaffolding. Honest scope: this packages the raw value's domain + algebra; it does not assemble `eₙ(P,Q)` — that needs Weil reciprocity, the frozen W4 no-go, since the base point `O ∈ supp(div f_P)`)

Weil-pairing foundations, rung 1 — torsion ⟺ principal divisor (`secp256k1_torsion_iff_principal`: a point `P` of secp256k1 is `n`-torsion `⟺ n • toClass P = 0`, i.e. iff the divisor `n·([P] − [O])` is principal in the coordinate ring `F[secp256k1]`. Obtained by transporting `n`-torsion across Mathlib's Abel–Jacobi map `toClass : W.Point →+ Additive (ClassGroup W.CoordinateRing)` — the injective embedding `E ↪ Pic` on which Mathlib *builds* the group law — via `toClass_eq_zero` + `map_nsmul`. This is the first genuine rung of the Weil pairing construction: principality of `n·([P] − [O])` is the existence precondition for the Miller function `f_P`. Key finding: the divisor-class substrate (`toClass`, `FunctionField`, `rootsOfUnity`) is already in Mathlib, so the pairing is more reachable than "from zero" — remaining rungs (extract `f_P`, evaluate at divisors, Weil reciprocity, bilinear `eₙ→μₙ`) are the open frontier, `notes/FOUNDATIONS.md`)

Weil-pairing foundations, rung 2 — the Miller function exists (`secp256k1_miller_function_exists`: for a nonzero `n`-torsion point `P=(x,y)` of secp256k1, there exists `f_P` in the function field `F(secp256k1)` generating the principal fractional ideal `(⟨X−x, Y−y⟩)ⁿ = (XYIdeal' h)ⁿ` — the Miller function, whose divisor is `n·([P] − [O])`. Extracted from rung 1: `n`-torsion trivializes the class `ClassGroup.mk ((XYIdeal' h)ⁿ) = (mk (XYIdeal' h))ⁿ = 1`, and Mathlib's `ClassGroup.mk_eq_one_iff` turns a trivial class into a principal ideal, whose generator is `f_P`. Rung W2 of the Weil sub-ladder — the input to Weil reciprocity / the pairing `eₙ`)

Weil-pairing foundations, rung 3 — the Miller function is unique up to a unit (`secp256k1_miller_function_unique`: two generators `f, g` of the same principal ideal `(XYIdeal' h)ⁿ` differ by a unit of the coordinate ring, `∃ u : F[secp256k1]ˣ, u • f = g` — the well-definedness input for the Weil pairing `eₙ` (its value must not depend on the chosen Miller function). Representative-independence half of rung W3. Proof designed by an AI model and kernel-verified — a piloted "strong-model + Lean-kernel" loop: the model read the Mathlib source, identified `Submodule.span_singleton_eq_span_singleton`, and produced the proof, which the kernel accepted)

Weil-pairing infrastructure — point-evaluation homomorphism (`evalAt`: for a rational point `(x,y)` on any Weierstrass curve over a field, evaluation of a regular function at `P` as a ring hom `F[E] →+* F`, built from Mathlib's `quotientXYIdealEquiv` (`F[E]/⟨X−x,Y−y⟩ ≃ F`); `evalAt_surjective` (every value attained — `P` is `F`-rational) and `evalAt_ker` (kernel `= ⟨X−x, Y−y⟩`, the maximal ideal of `P` — the functions vanishing at `P`). The first rung of the function-evaluation layer Mathlib lacks (v4.31 has no rational-function evaluation API and `F[E]` is not known to be Dedekind there); regular-function evaluation now exists, the rational extension via localization is next. Unblocks the Weil pairing's `f_P(D_Q)` step)

X³ + 7` is separable — exactly 3 distinct roots over `𝔽̄_p` (`secp256k1_cubic_separable` + `secp256k1_cubic_roots_card_bar` = 3 / `_nodup_bar`: the 2-torsion cubic `X³+7` (whose roots are the `x`-coordinates of the 2-torsion, `Ψ₂Sq = 4(X³+7)`) is coprime to its derivative `3X²` by a trivial Bézout certificate `u₀·(X³+7) + (v₀X)·(3X²) = 1` (`u₀ = 7⁻¹`, `v₀ = −21⁻¹`; `p ∤ 21`), so it is separable and splits with `natDegree = 3` distinct roots over the closure — the `n = 2` analogue of the `secp256k1_Ψ₃_separable` family, the counting brick of E[2]. Constants cert-verified `scripts/certs/cubic_separable_cert.py` (`CERT_OK`))

X³ = 1` has exactly 3 roots in `𝔽_p` (GLV cube-root count)

[n]`-numerator strictly dominates its denominator (`deg ΨSqₙ = n²−1 < n² = deg Φₙ`; so the rational map `x∘[n]=Φₙ/ψₙ²` attains degree `n²` at the numerator — the differential-free Route-B crux for `deg[n]=n²`, modulo coprimality; see `notes/SEPARABILITY_ROUTES.md`)

a `ZMod n`-module is killed by `n` (`n • x = 0`)

anomalous ⟺ trace one (`#E=p ⟺ a_p=1`; Smart/SSSA scope) ³

baby-step giant-step decomposition (`O(√n)` upper bound)

baby/giant step count `n ≤ ⌈√n⌉²` (`Θ(√n)` closure)

batch Schnorr verification (per-signature challenges `(∑sᵢ)G=∑Rᵢ+∑cᵢPᵢ`)

collision equation `a+xb ≡ c+xd (mod n)` (rho/BSGS solve step)

collision equation, `ZMod` subtractive form `(a−c)=x(d−b)

deg preΨ₄ = 6` (4-torsion bound up the tower)

deg Ψ₂Sq = 3` (2-torsion count: `#E[2] ≤ 4`)

deg Ψ₃ = 4` (3-torsion count `#E[3] ≤ 9`; GLV-relevant CM torsion)

deg(ψₙ)=(n²−1)/2` for all odd `n` coprime to `p` (uniform division-polynomial degree; generalizes the `Ψ₃`/`ψ₅` per-level facts via Mathlib's `natDegree_preΨ'`)

discrete log well-defined mod `n` (`g^x=g^y ⇒ x≡y`)

discrete-log recovery `x=(a−c)(d−b)⁻¹` (collision solve, `d−b` a unit)

discriminant identity `1728·Δ = -c₆²` (since `c₄ = 0`)

evalRatAt` extends `evalAt` (`evalRatAt_algebraMap`: for `(x,y)` on any Weierstrass curve over a field and a regular function `r ∈ F[E]`, the value of its image in the local ring `F[E]_P = Localization.AtPrime ⟨X−x,Y−y⟩` under `evalRatAt` equals its direct value `evalAt h r`. The correctness certificate that rational-function evaluation genuinely extends regular-function evaluation — the residue of the localization at `P` coincides *definitionally* with the quotient by `P`'s maximal ideal. Closes the evaluation layer before the Miller function `f_P` is evaluated; proof developed on the warm-server `lake env lean` loop)

fixed locus of the GLV automorphism `φ(P)=P ⟺ x=0` (`β·x=x ⇒ (β−1)x=0 ⇒ x=0` since `β≠1`; the ramification locus of `E→E/⟨φ⟩`, pins the order-3 automorphism's action together with `glvHom≠id`)

fixed-transcript affine collision core of the generic-group `Ω(√p)` bound (`p ≤ q·q` — a counting fact over a fixed set of affine forms; the adaptive-adversary/oracle wrapper that upgrades it to the full Shoup/Nechaev lower bound is not formalized, per the file docstring)

generic-group lower bound, square-root form `√p ≤ q

model soundness: `eval` is additive on forms (group mult ↔ form add)

model soundness: `eval` respects negation (group inverse ↔ form neg)

n = 3` division polynomials `Φ₃`/`ΨSq₃` for secp256k1 — canonical + explicit forms (`secp256k1_Φ₃`: `Φ 3 = X·Ψ₃² − preΨ₄·Ψ₂Sq`; `secp256k1_ΨSq₃`: `ΨSq 3 = Ψ₃²` — Mathlib's canonical `Φ_three`/`ΨSq_three` specialised to secp256k1. Substituting the concrete `Ψ₃ = 3X⁴+84X`, `preΨ₄ = 2X⁶+280X³−784`, `Ψ₂Sq = 4X³+28` gives the explicit degree-9 numerator `Φ₃(x) = x⁹−672x⁶+2352x³+21952` (`secp256k1_Φ₃_eval`) and degree-8 denominator `ΨSq₃(x) = 9x⁸+504x⁵+7056x²` (`secp256k1_ΨSq₃_eval`) of `x(3•P) = Φ₃/ΨSq₃`. Groundwork for node N7@3 and the degree half of N10(i) (`deg [n] = n²`): the numerator degree `9 = 3²` is the general `deg [n] = n²` prediction at `n = 3`. Ring identities in `𝔽_p[X]`, no `native_decide`)

n ∣ #E(𝔽_p)` for P-256 — base-point order divides the curve cardinality (`p256_n_dvd_card_point`: `P256.n ∣ Nat.card P256.toAffine.Point`, by Lagrange on `⟨G⟩` (order the proved `n`) + finiteness. The first verified fact about P-256's `#E` itself — all prior P-256 point-counting stayed inside `⟨G⟩`. Weak keystone: pins `#E ∈ {n, 2n, 3n, …}`. The strong keystone `#E = n` is NOT proved for P-256: the secp256k1 `j=0` / `−7`-non-cube 2-torsion route is `j=0`-specific and does not transfer (P-256 has `c₄=144≠0`, `j≠0`), and the general Hasse bound is a Mathlib gap. Pure-kernel)

n ∣ #E(𝔽_p)` — base-point order divides the curve cardinality (`secp256k1_n_dvd_card_point`: `Secp256k1.n ∣ Nat.card secp256k1.toAffine.Point`, by Lagrange on `⟨G⟩` (order the proved `n`) + finiteness. The first verified fact about `#E` itself — all prior point-counting stayed inside `⟨G⟩`. Pins `#E ∈ {n, 2n, 3n, …}`; the strong keystone `#E = n` is now proved on top, curve-specifically without Hasse/Schoof (`CurveCardinalityExact.lean`). Compiler-trusted: inherits `Lean.ofReduceBool` from the order keystone `secp256k1_generator_addOrderOf` via `secp256k1_grp_card` — the Lagrange/finiteness step itself adds no `native_decide`)

odd torsion ∩ 2-torsion = {O} (odd `n`: a point killed by both `n` and `2` is `O`, since `addOrderOf P ∣ gcd(n,2)=1`; node N12 of the `ψₙ↔E[n]` bridge decomposition — a reachable leaf toward the deep torsion correspondence, see `notes/DIVISION_POLY_TORSION_MAP.md`)

point-level 2-torsion criterion `2•P=0 ⟺ y=0` (both-directions `ψ₂↔E[2]` bridge at the point level — the criterion Mathlib records only as a TODO; upgrades the forward-only `Ψ₂Sq`-root fact)

point-level trace-zero identity `P+λP+λ²P=0` (pointwise reading of `glvHom_minpoly`: `X²+X+1` applied to any `P` returns `O`; the three points of a `⟨λ⟩`-orbit sum to zero)

preΨ' 11` has ≤ 60 roots in `𝔽_p` (degree-60 polynomial ⇒ ≤ 60 roots with multiplicity; instance of the uniform odd root bound at `n=11`; polynomial layer only — the root ↔ 11-torsion correspondence is *not* formalized (unlike `ℓ∈{2,3,5,7}`), so this carries no `#E[11]` statement; classical expectation `E[11]≅(ℤ/11)²` is unproved motivation)

preΨ' 13` has ≤ 84 roots in `𝔽_p` (degree-84 polynomial ⇒ ≤ 84 roots with multiplicity; instance of the uniform odd root bound at `n=13`; polynomial layer only — the root ↔ 13-torsion correspondence is *not* formalized (unlike `ℓ∈{2,3,5,7}`), so this carries no `#E[13]` statement; classical expectation `E[13]≅(ℤ/13)²` is unproved motivation)

preΨ' 5` and `preΨ' 7` are coprime — `E[5] ⊥ E[7]` (`IsCoprime (secp256k1.preΨ' 5) (secp256k1.preΨ' 7)` — "no point is both 5- and 7-torsion" (a shared `x`-coordinate would force `Q = ±P`, i.e. `5 = 7`); CAS extended-Euclid Bézout certificate over `𝔽_p` (`scripts/certs/torsion_disjoint_5_7.py`; `Res(ψ₅,ψ₇) = 2¹⁹²·3¹⁴⁴·7⁹⁶`, prime support `{2,3,7}` = the curve's bad-reduction primes), both polynomials on exponents `≡ 0 (mod 3)` so the product collapses to twelve residue equations against the degree-24 `preΨ' 7` — the twelve-power sibling of `CoprimePsi3Psi7`; completes pairwise `{2,3,5,7}`-torsion `x`-locus disjointness. Reuses `secp256k1_preΨ₅`/`secp256k1_preΨ₇`)

preΨ₄ = 2X⁶ + 280X³ − 784` (secp256k1 4-division polynomial auxiliary)

preΨ₄ ≠ 0` (proper finite root set)

preΨ₄` and `preΨ' 5` are coprime — `E[4] ⊥ E[5]` (`IsCoprime secp256k1.preΨ₄ (secp256k1.preΨ' 5)` — no nonidentity point is both (primitive) 4- and 5-torsion (a shared `x` would force `Q = ±P`, i.e. `4 = 5`); CAS extended-Euclid Bézout certificate over `𝔽_p` (`Res(preΨ₄,ψ₅) = 2⁴⁸·3³⁶·7²⁴`, prime support `{2,3,7}` = the curve's bad-reduction primes), both on exponents `≡ 0 (mod 3)`, six collapsed residue equations; extends the `preΨ₄ ⊥ {2,3}` pairs toward the `{2,3,4,5,7}`-torsion disjointness matrix)

preΨ₄` and `preΨ' 7` are coprime — `E[4] ⊥ E[7]` (`IsCoprime secp256k1.preΨ₄ (secp256k1.preΨ' 7)` — no nonidentity point is both (primitive) 4- and 7-torsion; CAS extended-Euclid Bézout certificate over `𝔽_p` (`Res(preΨ₄,ψ₇) = 2⁹⁶·3⁷²·7⁴⁸`, prime support `{2,3,7}`), both on exponents `≡ 0 (mod 3)`, ten collapsed residue equations; with `CoprimePsi4Psi5` completes `preΨ₄ ⊥ {2,3,5,7}` — full mutual disjointness of the `{2,3,4,5,7}`-torsion `x`-loci)

r`-general elliptic-sequence identity ⇐ its `r=1` case (`isEllSequence_of_rec_one`: any `W:ℤ→R` over a `CommRing` satisfying the two-index recurrence is an `IsEllSequence`; pure `linear_combination`, no `W 1=1` needed — more general than the roadmap expected. Isolates all remaining content of the open Mathlib TODO "`normEDS` is elliptic" into the `r=1` master recurrence; first upstream-Mathlib stepping stone toward it, see `notes/B1_TRACTABILITY_MAP.md`)

secp256k1 11-division polynomial has degree 60 (`deg(preΨ' 11)=(11²−1)/2=60`; instantiates Mathlib's general `natDegree_preΨ'` at `n=11` — an instance of `secp256k1_odd_preΨ_natDegree`; closes the `eleven_torsion_degree` prover-loop target; polynomial layer only: no `ℓ=11` torsion bridge is formalized, so no `E[11]` claim)

secp256k1 13-division polynomial has degree 84 (`deg(preΨ' 13)=(13²−1)/2=84`; instantiates Mathlib's general `natDegree_preΨ'` at `n=13` — an instance of `secp256k1_odd_preΨ_natDegree`; closes the `thirteen_torsion_degree` prover-loop target; polynomial layer only: no `ℓ=13` torsion bridge is formalized, so no `E[13]` claim)

secp256k1 2-division polynomial `Ψ₂Sq = 4X³+28` (Mathlib torsion bridge; 2-torsion `x`-coords)

secp256k1 3-division polynomial `Ψ₃ = 3X⁴+84X` (3-torsion `E[3]`; the CM-by-ℤ[ζ₃] / GLV structure)

secp256k1 5-division polynomial has degree 12 (`deg(ψ₅=preΨ' 5)=(5²−1)/2=12`; instantiates Mathlib's general `natDegree_preΨ'` at `n=5`)

secp256k1 7-division polynomial has degree 24 (`deg(ψ₇=preΨ' 7)=(7²−1)/2=24`; instantiates Mathlib's general `natDegree_preΨ'` at `n=7`)

secp256k1 BSGS upper bound `⌈√n⌉ ≤ 2^128+1` (tight `√n` security)

secp256k1 CM Frobenius certificate (`N(π)=a²−ab+b²=p` `secp256k1_frobenius_norm`, `Tr(π)=2a−b=p+1−n` `secp256k1_frobenius_trace`, `4p=t²+3b²` `secp256k1_four_p_eq_trace_sq` — the integer CM data for `π=a+bω`; with `t²<4p` this pins `End(E)⊗ℚ=ℚ(√−3)`, the order `ℤ[ω]` of discriminant −3 (corrects mistaken CM composites). Arithmetic certificate, not a Frobenius-as-endomorphism proof — that CM theory is a Mathlib gap)

secp256k1 GLV endomorphism acts as `[λ]` at the generator (`glvPoint G = λ·G`, unconditional)

secp256k1 GLV endomorphism acts as `[λ]` on all of `⟨G⟩` (`glvPoint P = λ·P` ∀ P ∈ zmultiples G — unconditional, no point-counting)

secp256k1 `3 ∣ (n−1)` (GLV eigenvalue `λ` in `ℤ/n`)

secp256k1 `3 ∣ (p−1)` (cube root `β` in `𝔽_p`)

secp256k1 `E[n] = ker[n]` (torsion = kernel of `[n]` on the curve group)

secp256k1 `E[n]` = points of order dividing `n` (curve-named)

secp256k1 `b₂ = 0` (Weierstrass invariant)

secp256k1 `b₄ = 0` (Weierstrass invariant)

secp256k1 `b₆ = 28` (Weierstrass invariant)

secp256k1 `b₈ = 0` (Weierstrass invariant)

secp256k1 `c₆ = -6048` (Weierstrass `c₆` invariant)

secp256k1 `c₆ ≠ 0` (`-6048 ≢ 0 mod p`)

secp256k1 `p ≡ 3 (mod 4)` (point decompression)

secp256k1 `p−1` smooth-divisor ceiling — a target-property screen fact (`secp256k1_p_sub_one_factorization`: the complete prime factorization `p−1 = 2·3·7·13441·C` with `C` the 237-bit prime cofactor, reusing the Pratt node already established for `p`; `secp256k1_smooth_divisor_dvd_smooth_part`: every 13441-smooth divisor of `p−1` divides `564522 = 2·3·7·13441 ≈ 2^19.11`, since the remaining cofactor is prime and strictly larger, hence coprime to any such divisor; `secp256k1_smooth_divisor_le` gives the numeric ceiling `d ≤ 564522`. An exact arithmetic ceiling on the target, decidable in advance, used to screen published factor-base constructions that require `p−1` to carry a large smooth divisor — at zero experimental cost. Not an ECDLP statement, not a complexity bound, not a claim about any algorithm, and says nothing about the group order `n`, extension fields, or auxiliary curves. Inherits `Lean.ofReduceBool` from one closed `native_decide` identity)

secp256k1 `β` has order 3 in `𝔽_p` (GLV CM generator)

secp256k1 `λ` has order 3 in `ℤ/n` (GLV CM generator)

secp256k1 `⟨P⟩ ⊆ E[n]` (finite-order point's subgroup is `n`-torsion)

secp256k1 base point `G ≠ O` (SEC2 generator as a non-zero curve point)

secp256k1 base point `G` is on the curve (`Gy² ≡ Gx³+7 mod p`)

secp256k1 base point annihilated by `n` (`n·G = 0`, supporting `addOrderOf`)

secp256k1 base point has exact order `n` (weak point-counting keystone: `⟨G⟩` cyclic of order `n`, no Hasse/`#E`)

secp256k1 base point is non-identity (`G ≠ 0`, supporting `addOrderOf`)

secp256k1 classical attack-resistance profile — the substrate thesis, one unconditional theorem (`secp256k1_classical_security_profile`: a single kernel-verified conjunction certifying that *every known classically-expressible ECDLP shortcut is blocked* — `#E = n` (cofactor 1) ∧ `Nat.Prime n` (⇒ no Pohlig–Hellman reduction, no proper subgroup) ∧ `t ≠ 0` (not supersingular) ∧ `t ≠ 1` (not anomalous) ∧ `t² ≤ 4p` (Hasse) ∧ embedding degree `> 100` (no MOV/FR transfer). Honest scope: this is the *classical structural* envelope, not a hardness proof — the only proved hardness is the generic `Ω(√n)` bound (`secp256k1_generic_security`), and it is classical-only (Shor breaks ECDLP quantumly). The machine-checked statement of "every classical attack we can express is blocked", not "unbreakable". Assembles proved conjuncts; inherits `Lean.ofReduceBool` from them)

secp256k1 discriminant nonzero `Δ ≠ 0` in `𝔽_p

secp256k1 field prime `p` is prime (full Pratt certificate)